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Using c. 16,000 fortnightly paybills from Wylam Colliery in the Northern 
Coalfield, we assess the standard-of-living of Tyneside coal miners between 
1836 and 1862. We argue that the earnings of hewers were lower than currently 
proposed by the literature, and that the employment of additional family 
members provided the income necessary for survival. We also quantitatively 
demonstrate the wage levels of other, more junior, occupations.  
 
Additionally, we argue that mining families did not earn more than those in other 
industries due to the income of adult males; instead they generated additional 
income through child labour. We also assess worker migration, and 
independently confirm the existing commentary in the literature. In addition, we 
investigate other factors affecting standard-of-living, such as progression through 
mining occupations. 
 
We have used our data not only to investigate the average wage level of these 
miners, but also to critique the use of wages in assessing standard-of-living. We 
have therefore calculated the fluctuations in earnings on a fortnightly basis, and 
discussed the impact this would have had on standard-of-living. We have also 
considered the deviation in the earnings of workers, and the extent to which 
families may have differed from the norm. Furthermore, we have also considered 
the aspects of standard-of-living which we are unable to comment on using our 
present data. We conclude that experiences varied considerably, and therefore 
that whilst the use of the mean wage by most scholars is informative, it is only 
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The overall aim of this study is to investigate the living standards of Tyneside 
coal miners in the context of the Industrial Revolution. Using data from Wylam 
Colliery, we address a variety of questions regarding the working lives of these 
miners, and how this impacted on their lives as a whole. We consider the family 
economy in a variety of ways- not purely limited to earning potential, but also its 
effect on migration. The living standards of British workers during the Industrial 
Revolution has seen much debate in historical literature. In recent years, it has 
taken on a new relevance, becoming the basis for a school-of-thought which 
explains the onset of the British Industrial Revolution and why Britain was first 
to industrialise.1 Yet the fortunes of these workers are still hotly debated.2 By 
limiting ourselves to one group of workers in one industry, we are able to 
examine in detail the lives of these workers, and evaluate to what extent they 
were ‘rich’. 
 
The Northeast was considered to be the leading British coalfield, with the best 
colliery managers, and the most skilled miners.3 It underwent a rapid expansion 
during the period of our study, supplying coal both for consumption elsewhere in 
the country (via its coastal trade), and for the rapidly growing local iron 
industry.4 By 1862 its output was sixteen times the size it had been a century and 
a half earlier, in 1700.5 It is therefore an important industry to the British 
Industrial Revolution as a whole, as well as an interesting region in its own right, 
during this period. 
 
                                                 
1 Robert C. Allen, The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 15–16. 
2 for example; Jane Humphries, “The Lure of Aggregates and the Pitfalls of the Patriarchal 
Perspective: A Critique of the High Wage Economy Interpretation of the British Industrial 
Revolution,” The Economic History Review 66, no. 3 (August 1, 2013): 693. 
3 Michael W. Flinn, The History of the British Coal Industry. Volume 2, 1700-1830 : The 
Industrial Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 28. 
4 B. R. Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry 1800-1914 (Cambridge 
Cambridgeshire ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 16. 
5 Roy A. Church, The History of the British Coal Industry. Volume 3, 1830-1913 : Victorian Pre-
Eminence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 3; Flinn, The History of the British Coal Industry. 
Volume 2, 1700-1830, 1984, 26. 
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It would be a mistake to consider this study as purely a micro-history of the 
colliery at Wylam. Of course, to some extent, it is just that. All of our data come 
from the same colliery, and therefore the majority of workers lived in the same 
village. But our research agenda has repercussions and applications for our 
understanding of coal-miners in the Northeast as a whole. We therefore urge that 
this research be considered as a case study of the Northern coalfield, from which 
conclusions can be applied to all coal mining in that area. Wylam may not be the 
perfect case study, but the level of detail which these paybills provide is unique, 
and the accompanying long running series of Pitmen’s Bonds6 even more so. 
Although not the largest colliery in the area, it was certainly mid-sized, and 
therefore may be more representative of an average workers’ experience. Whilst 
the colliery was independently owned, it was part of the organisation in the 
Northeast which limited the amount of coal allowed to be sold via costal 
transport, and the Blackett family who owned it had been in the coal trade for 
decades.  
 
We have, throughout this study, tried to place our workers in the context of this 
area, and consider what might be motivating the differences between our work 
and the literature. We conclude that despite these explanations, the literature at 
present holds several views which are not consistent with our findings. These 
are; that the current accepted level of earnings overestimates the actual income of 
miners during this period; that the concentration on the earnings of hewers has 
resulted in scholars ignoring the tangible effects of the equality between hewers’ 
and putters’ earnings, and that average wage rates overlook the very different 
fortunes of individual workers. Not all of these points are original7, but all are at 
present under-explored. From these observations, we expand our investigation to 
                                                 
6 The Pitmen’s Bond was a contract which bound the worker to a colliery, usually for the period 
of a year (although this changed in the 1840s; see pages 45-50 for a more in depth discussion). It 
guaranteed the worker certain rights and priviledges (again seepages 45-50) in exchanges for his 
services. It also clearly set out the duties he was required to perform, and the rate at which he 
would be paid for this work. Church, The History of the British Coal Industry. Volume 3, 1830-
1913, 1986, 260. 
7 Church has highlighted that as his earnings are calculated from shift rates, the number of days 
worked per week and fines would lower wage levels. Jaffe and Flinn have both identified that 
putters could earn as much as hewers, but have not quantitatively investigated this. See; Ibid., 
560; James Alan Jaffe, The Struggle for Market Power: Industrial Relations in the British Coal 
Industry, 1800-1840 (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 83; Flinn, The History of the British 
Coal Industry. Volume 2, 1700-1830, 1984, 391. 
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the role of the family in mining life, and the difference additional workers could 
make to the welfare of the family. We find that Rowntree’s poverty cycle is 
relevant here8, but that the difference between its peaks and troughs are far 
greater for mining families than those in other industries.  
 
In other respects, our findings confirm those of the literature. We find the general 
shape of the wage series to be broadly consistent with that of Church, but at an 
absolute lower level. We argue that this speaks to the accuracy of our own series. 
We also corroborate Hair’s investigation of migration in the coalfield by a 
completely independent method, and come to similar conclusions. We have also 
drawn upon the findings of fluctuations in wages and attempted to tie them more 
closely to the family economy and the consequences for the standard-of-living. 
However, we do use our work on the family economy to challenge the notion 
that individual miners were significantly better off than those in other industries 
during the Industrial Revolution. 
 
We also touch upon the structure of the coal mining trade, and how a young boy 
might progress through the occupations of the mine to the role of hewer. To this 
extent we incorporate a more dynamic understanding of standards-of-living 
insofar as we consider how earnings would change over time. We argue that 
experience in other occupations was vital for this progression, and that this is 
indicated through the secondary employments within the mine of around half the 
workers in this period. We find that men who had gone through this progression 
and become hewers were most resistant to this practise and preferred to work 
exclusively in hewing. As they had already reached the peak of their profession, 
they no longer required the experience to move up through the mine. We also 
argue for the centrality of the family unit to labour in the mine. 
 
We establish our research agenda with a review of the literature relevant to the 
topic- starting with the importance of wages to the ‘incentives view’ of British 
industrialisation. We then move on to an evaluation of this use of wages as a 
proxy for living standards, followed by a review of the specific coal mining 
                                                 




literature. We also explain our sources and methodology in dealing with our data. 
Our analysis is then split into eight sections, the main themes of which have been 
outlined above. Finally, our concluding section summarises our findings at 
present and identifies where future research could improve our understanding of 
standard-of-living beyond that of income. 
 
Literature Review 
We now review the literature relevant to our field of inquiry, on both an industry-
specific level, and in a wider context. We first consider how the wider literature 
has motivated our present research, before taking a critical approach to measures 
of living standards. Finally we assess literature specifically concerned with coal 
mining and Wylam colliery. 
The ‘Incentives-based’ Industrial Revolution 
Any discussion of wages during the Industrial Revolution must first engage with 
the scholarship of Bob Allen, which has recently become dominant. Allen’s view 
of why Britain industrialised first disregards the ‘classic’ view (which favours 
the ‘unique’ nature of British institutions) and the “Industrial Enlightenment”9 (in 
which an accumulation of “useful knowledge”10, driven by an elite few,11 led to 
technological developments12) advanced by Mokyr, in favour of a British ‘high-
wage, cheap-energy’ economy. Supposedly, this situation encouraged the 
invention of new technologies because of cheaply available natural resources, 
whereas elsewhere coal was expensive so using labour was more profitable.13 
The ‘Allen-thesis’ therefore hinges upon this ‘high-wage, cheap-energy’ 
economy.  
 
Humphries’ recent work claims Allen “underestimates the relative caloric needs 
of women and children”14 and therefore created a “false household economy”15. 
                                                 
9 Joel Mokyr, The Enlightened Economy : An Economic History of Britain 1700-1850 (New 
Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 2009), 40. 
10 Ibid., 35. 
11 Ibid., 85. 
12 Ibid., 83–84. 
13 Allen, The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective, 15–16. 
14 Humphries, “The Lure of Aggregates and the Pitfalls of the Patriarchal Perspective,” 695. 
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Somewhat in keeping with Allen’s view, Humphries’ concluded that there was a 
motivation for mechanisation, but this was to utilise female and child labour, not 
cheap energy, as women and children could then perform the tasks of adult males 
without the strength and skill previously required.16 
 
Coal mining itself creates a peculiar problem for the Allen-thesis. The high 
wages of its workers fit with his general argument, but this should have elevated 
the price of coal, and therefore made it more expensive. Allen’s own wage series 
is based upon London builders’ wages.17 These journeyman workers are hardly 
representative of all British workers in all industries, and therefore calls into 
question just how far this theory applies to all British workers.  
 
The present study therefore has been influenced by this debate on two fronts. 
Firstly, it has motivated us to consider the issue of a ‘male breadwinner’ versus 
‘the family’. Our consideration of child labour in the earnings of a household can 
therefore help to settle the debate around the main sources of income for the 
typical British mining family during the period. Secondly, these arguments rely 
almost entirely on average wage levels as a measure of standard-of-living, and 
fail to account for any other factors which influenced quality-of-life. At present, 
we do not have the data to expand much beyond this ourselves, but we do intend 
to place our study of living standards within a wider context. 
  
Living Standards in the Industrial Revolution 
The main focus of this study is the wage data for Wylam coal miners. We have 
approached this in a variety of ways; beginning with the customary review of 
adult male wage levels. However, we have then expanded our approach to use 
wage data in ways completely unrelated to the actual level of wages (see 
Migration) and highlighted the contributions of other family members to the 
household (see The Family). The focus of this section however, is a discussion of 
how representative wages are of standard-of-living. This has been a growing 
                                                                                                                                    
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 709. 
17 Allen, The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective, 33–34. 
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theme in the literature in recent years, which will be discussed here, along with 
our own contribution and how this has been implemented. We also acknowledge 
some of the problems with our reliance on wages as a measure of standard-of-
living.  
 
Firstly, it should be noted that many scholars have used wages as a measure of 
standard-of-living, and this is an important addition to our collective knowledge. 
They have, however, used different indices and wage series to reach very 
different conclusions. Lindert and Williamson have argued that workers enjoyed 
significant gains over the period of our study, and that real wages “nearly 
doubled between 1820 and 1850”.18 In opposition, Feinstein concluded real 
wages were stagnant for the first half of the 1800s, even falling during certain 
periods.19 His response to Lindert and Williamson argued “the standard-of-living 
of the average working-class family improved by less than 15 percent between 
the 1780s and 1850s”20 and this was “consistent with other […] indicators.”21 
Feinstein demonstrates real earnings were stagnant from the 1780s to 1830s, 
when they started to increase, only to fall back and restart the process in the 
1840s.22 He claimed more “substantial gains”23 were not felt until the 1860s.24 
Feinstein achieved this by improving the index used to deflate his wage series- 
including potatoes, milk, cheese, oats and beer,25 and more accurate estimates for 
clothing and rent.26 Additionally, Feinstein used three separate base years rather 
than Lindert and Williamson’s one.27  
 
We therefore see that scholars have come to very different conclusions regarding 
the general trends in wages over the period of our study. Our wage series adds to 
                                                 
18 Peter H. Lindert and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “English Workers’ Living Standards During the 
Industrial Revolution: A New Look,” The Economic History Review 36, no. 1 (February 1, 1983): 
11. 
19 Charles H. Feinstein, “Pessimism Perpetuated: Real Wages and the Standard of Living in 
Britain during and after the Industrial Revolution,” The Journal of Economic History 58, no. 03 
(1998): 649. 
20 Ibid., 625. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 349. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 641–642. 
26 Ibid., 642. 
27 Ibid., 641. 
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this body of data, and assesses the trends in workers’ wages over the middle of 
the nineteenth century. Yet even within the use of wages, these studies fail to 
capture a large amount of useful information. Firstly, these studies are based on 
mean wages. This is perhaps the best way to display the general trend, but it fails 
to capture much of the variation in the data- implying that every man in 1840 (for 
example) earned the same wage. This study questions to what extent this was the 
case, and therefore if the standard-of-living can be directly assumed from such 
measures. We have therefore been careful to report the standard deviation of 
wages from the mean at relevant points in our analysis. Additionally, using 
annual estimates (as these studies do) again reduces the wealth of experiences of 
different workers. An advantage of using fortnightly wage data (which, in 
fairness, is not always available) as the present study has done, is that it allows us 
to report how much an individuals’ fortnightly earnings varied over the year. 
Again, we have indicated this, and measured how much the sample of individuals 
varied as a whole, at various points. 
We should also consider some of the assumptions that working with wage data 
tends to make about standard-of-living. Most importantly, it assumes that 
workers are something economists call “rational”28 actors. This essentially means 
that they will always look to maximise their earnings. We will demonstrate later 
in this study that our miners did not always act in such a manner, but this also has 
an impact on our thinking with regards to standard-of-living. For example, wages 
fail to account for any preference for leisure time which an individual might 
have, instead of looking to earn more money. Assessing standard-of-living only 
through wages would indicate that a man who worked more but had less leisure 
time had a higher standard-of-living than one who did the opposite. Depending 
on our definition of standard-of-living this may not have been the case. We have 
no data on the individual leisure activities of Wylam’s miners, but we should 
recall in our assessment of their living standards that factors such as leisure 
played a role.  
 
                                                 




Additionally, we should consider the idea that the workers’ environment 
contributed to his standard-of-living. Williamson also reports that British 
workers demanded a premium for working in cities. He demonstrates that 
workers in urban environments were compensated for a loss in health-related 
standard-of-living (for example; sanitation, urban crowding) by increased wages. 
Williamson found in order for workers to move to newly industrialising cities, a 
wage increase of up to thirty percent (compared to rural areas) was necessary in 
the 1830s and 1840s.29 Voth has expanded this to calculate a worker “risk 
premium”30 for those employed in urban areas. He computed the increase in 
wages an urban worker should have demanded in order to compensate him for 
his increased risk of mortality; his findings were that “migrants may have shown 
a net gain in the north […] and that a sizeable advantage was likely in the 
south”.31  
 
We can apply this idea to those in dangerous industries such as coal mining. 
Firstly, the dangerous working environment and the poor sanitation of their 
living conditions mean the lives of miners were perhaps more comparable to 
urban than rural workers. Secondly, a miner was at far greater risk of death or 
injury (via cave-in or explosion), and contracting an illness from working 
conditions.32 It therefore follows miners would demand higher wages than 
counterparts in other industries, but their lifetime earnings would be more 
comparable. This is complicated not only by mortality, but morbidity and 
retirement. Church has highlighted a contradiction in contemporary accounts of 
miners’ health (which speak of the preponderance of diseases such as bronchitis 
and rheumatism), and calculated figures, which show occupational mortality (in a 
slightly later period) to be comparatively good for those in the mining 
                                                 
29 Jeffrey G. Williamson, Coping with City Growth during the British Industrial Revolution 
(Cambridge England ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 257. 
30 Hans-Joachim Voth, “Living Standards and the Urban Environment,” in The Cambridge 
Economic History of Modern Britain, ed. Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson (Cambridge: 




32 McIvor and Johnson found that mortality due to accidents and respiratory diseases was higher 
in the coal trade than in other industries; Arthur McIvor and Ronald Johnston, Miners’ Lung: A 
History of Dust Disease in British Coal Mining (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2007), 41. 
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profession.33 He attributes this to the under recording of deaths of retired miners 
from these diseases, the early retirement of miners from the most physically 
demanding jobs (between 45 and 55), and the “favourable age structure”34 which 
meant that only strong young men were working in the trade, and therefore 
disguised the potential increase in mortality.35 These factors explain why the 
working career of a miner would be shorter than in other occupations (through 
mortality, morbidity or custom) and therefore he demanded a premium for his 
shorter window of peak earnings. Additionally, Bowden and Mills have used 
census information from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to 
demonstrate that coal miners in Northumberland and Durham had a life 
expectancy of 53 years, with 25 percent dying before the age of 34 (their data 
have been supplied in Appendix Five with Bowden’s permission).36 This was on 
par with coal miners as a whole, and one year longer than males in industrial 
districts (although industrial workers had a lower chance of dying under 34, at 20 
percent). By comparison, adults males in agricultural districts could expect to 
live an extra ten years, and have a greater chance at living beyond the age of 34 
(only 14 percent would die beforehand). Overall, northern coal miners could 
expect to live six year less than the average adult male, and were eight percent 
more likely to die before the age of 34.  
 
However, whilst these arguments include environmental factors in wage data, 
they do not really consider the environment itself as part of the standard-of-living 
measure. Although the wages of the present study do much to explain the access 
that a worker (and his family) had to resources which would affect their 
standard-of-living (such as food) and help to explain some of their actions (such 
as the age at which their children started work), they do not really consider the 
working or living conditions in their own right. This is an important regard in 
which wages fail to capture the essence of standard-of-living. 
 
                                                 
33 Church, The History of the British Coal Industry. Volume 3, 1830-1913, 1986, 595. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 594–595. 
36 Sue Bowden and Judith W. Mills, “University of York Centre for Research in Economic 
History Discussion Papers: Occupational Mortality, Age at Marriage and Marital Fertility in 
Early Twentieth Century England and Wales,” February 2004. 
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Some scholars have sought to include more of these environmental factors in 
measures of living standards. Height has been seen to act as a measure of 
nutrition throughout childhood and early adulthood, and therefore embodies the 
living standards of an individuals’ early life.37 Additionally, children can be 
affected by the same factors during pregnancy.38 Floud, with Wachter and 
Gregory, discovered boys at Sandhurst military academy could differ in heights 
by fourteen centimetres depending on their social background.39 They also 
calculated increasing average heights between 1760 and 1830, although these 
were relatively minimal.40 However, this style of “anthropometric”41 history has 
been problematic, as it does not seem particularly correlated with income in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.42 Whilst we do not know the heights (or 
anything about the physical wellbeing) of the workers at Wylam, this literature 
identifies the effects which environmental factors could have on standard-of-
living, and demonstrates that it is not something which can be captured through 
the use of wages alone. We might also include in this category measures such as 
life expectancy and infant mortality. The coal pits were not a healthy 
environment for those working in them, and were particularly damaging due to 
the young age at which boys began work. We must recall this when discussing 
standard-of-living.  
 
Additionally, others have focussed on the rights and freedoms of workers as a 
measure of living standards. Crafts has applied the Human Development Index to 
Industrial Revolution Britain. This measure contains three aspects- GDP per 
capita, life expectancy, and access to education.43 Crafts also incorporated civil 
and political rights and freedoms, concluding living standards did improve 
throughout the period 1780 to 1850.44 Wages obviously contribute to the first of 
the three HDI categories (and will likely correlate with the third). Life 
                                                 
37 Voth, “Living Standards and the Urban Environment,” 274. 
38 Ibid., 274. 
39 Roderick Floud, Height, Health, and History : Nutritional Status in the United Kingdom, 1750-
1980 (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 197. 
40 Voth, “Living Standards and the Urban Environment,” 276. 
41 Ibid., 274. 
42 Ibid. 
43 N. F. R. Crafts, “The Human Development Index and Changes in Standards of Living: Some 
Historical Comparisons,” European Review of Economic History 1, no. 3 (December 1, 1997): 
620. 
44 Ibid., 626. 
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expectancy links to the point above regarding the inclusion of environmental 
factors when measuring of standard-of-living. Other factors such as access to 
education and the right to vote are also aspects of living standards which are 
unrelated to wages. The existing literature does discuss the political activism and 
freedoms (such as that to form a trade union) of miners in the Northeast. This 
will be addressed in the Coalmining- Northeast section of the literature view 
below. We are therefore able to think about these in the context of our miners, 
however these rights have not yet been quantified at all, let alone in a manner 
which compares to the advanced nature of Crafts’ work and would be viable to 
compare to other regions. 
 
Overall, using wages as a measure of living standards is not perfect. It fails to 
account for health-related standards-of-living, preference for activities outside of 
work, and personal freedoms which formed a key part of the general happiness of 
any individual. However, wages are an important part of any assessment of 
quality-of-life. They also act as a proxy measure, for some of the factors which 
have been described above. The most important thing for any study which 
attempts to fit wages into the picture of living standards is to be aware of its 
limitations. We therefore acknowledge that whilst there are many aspects of 
standard-of-living which we are not able to discuss with the data presently 
available, wages do play an important part in this story. Within the use of wages 
themselves there are also methodological issues, which restrict their explanatory 
power, but we have taken care to address these in sufficient detail, and 
incorporate them into our overall picture of living standards. 
Nominal versus Real Wages as a Measure 
 
The present study has included analysis of both nominal and real wages. 
However, outside of comparisons with the existing literature, it has taken a 
preference for nominal wages. This is due to several reasons, which will now be 
examined.  
 
Firstly, it was considered how relevant existing cost-of-living indices were to the 
present study. This is not intended to say that real wages should be dismissed in 
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any scenario. Ideally, wages would always be adjusted for the cost-of-living in a 
study of living standards. However, to do so with an unsuitable index would do 
more harm than good. We have used existing indices (specifically Church’s 
combination of the GRS and Wood indices, and Clark’s recent series based on 
the earnings of agricultural labourers) to assess the relative level of wages in 
different years throughout the series. This has been a fruitful exercise, and gives 
a very similar picture to that provided by the nominal wages. However, these 
indices do not necessarily capture baskets-of-goods relevant to miners at Wylam. 
Whilst both have a relatively large range of goods included, the weighting of 
these goods is particularly important.45 The use of an imperfect index (with 
weightings not appropriate for the sample employed) will give a picture of 
standard-of-living which is misleading. Whilst data for the specific consumption 
patterns of Wylam mining families are not available, we will demonstrate that 
they seem to have enjoyed a relatively high income. This usually meant the 
consumption of more luxury or higher quality goods. Therefore indices based on 
weightings for agricultural workers (Clark), or general weightings (GRS and 
Wood) are not ideal, and whilst they do control for some changes over time, 
should not be overly relied upon.  
 
Secondly, as the process of annual bonding meant that piece rates (or daily rates 
for junior workers) were fixed throughout the year, nominal wages have been 
preferred. This is because (in addition to problems with the appropriateness of 
indices mentioned above), as Clark notes, the relative movements of nominal 
wages year-on-year tells us about the state of the labour market, and whether 
supply and demand dynamics were in effect.46 Furthermore, coal owners reacted 
to changes in the price of coal, which were not necessarily correlated with 
changes in the price of other goods. Therefore, to use a real wage index with our 
wage data would distort the image of industrial relations which we are trying to 
capture. We could use a measure which controlled for the price of coal, but this 
would not provide values representative of purchasing power. This has relevance 
                                                 
45 This issue has been highlighted by many scholars. See, for example; Pat Hudson, History by 
Numbers: An Introduction to Quantitative Approaches (London : New York: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2000), 116; Roderick Floud, ed., Essays in Quantitative Economic History (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1974), 11. 
46 Gregory Clark, “The Long March of History: Farm Wages, Population, and Economic Growth, 
England 1209–18691,” The Economic History Review 60, no. 1 (2007): 115. 
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for measures such as migration, which are as much an expression of relative 
power as of earning potential. For those measures more directly linked to 
standard-of-living, such as deviations and fluctuations in wages, the nominal 
wage has also been used. This is because dispersion of individual wage entries is 
harder to capture when using index values, and is more meaningful when it can 
be expressed as a unit of currency.  
 
Overall, whilst we do not deny the usefulness of real wages in assessing income 
and standard-of-living, we believe that they must be used appropriately. 
Additionally, some measures are more easily interpretable when using nominal 
wages. Therefore whilst this study employs a real wage index in assessing 
relative levels of income over time, nominal wages have been preferred for other 
measures. 
Coal Mining- National 
The historical literature for coal mining has a strong narrative. Whilst miners’ 
experiences varied by geography, the Northeast has received particular attention. 
We must therefore examine present knowledge to place Wylam miners in this 
story. 
 
An excellent starting point is Flinn’s The History of the British Coal Mining 
Industry, Volume 2 1700-1830. Here, he argues there was a clear division 
between the underground and over-ground workers,47 with the demand mainly 
for the former.48 This accounts for the higher wage rates of underground workers, 
and their selection as the focus for this study. Flinn also addresses underground 
female employment in mines, claiming it “had already ceased by about 1720”49 
in the Northeast. This suggests men and boys were either the only wage earners 
in their household or that women worked in other industries- relatively few in 
mining villages like Wylam. 
 
                                                 
47 Flinn, The History of the British Coal Industry. Volume 2, 1700-1830, 1984, 329. 
48 Ibid., 331. 
49 Ibid., 333. 
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Flinn also argues colliers were viewed as an ethnic group, making distinctions 
between ‘miners’, ‘pitmen’ and ‘colliers’.50 He quotes mining innovator John 
Buddle, who claimed “Our peculiar race of pitmen […] can only be kept up by 
breeding”.51 Flinn claims this was embodied in the way miners treated their sons, 
who were forced into the mines before they could consider other employment.52 
Flinn also adds a further breakdown of class based on skill, using Buddle’s idea 
of “middling good pitmen, a thorough good pitmen, and a pitmen”.53 This can be 
investigated by examining the consistent earnings level of individual workers. If 
Buddle’s argument is accurate, there should be consistent differences in earnings.  
 
Following Flinn, Church contributed the third volume of the series. He argues the 
Mines and Collieries Act 1842 was more significant for child labour than 
women.54 This further supports either men being the only wage earners, or 
women finding employment in other industries. He estimates in 1842 up to thirty 
percent of coal miners nationally were under twenty, and thirteen percent under 
fifteen, although he cites Hair’s thesis which concluded child employment was 
below the national average on the Tyne.55  
 
Church discusses technology reducing the need for child labour, but concludes 
this was not always so- the trapping system of the Northeast being an example of 
the reverse.56 In the Northeast, he argues “free colliery housing and limited 
alternative employment opportunities”57 contributed to the “hereditary nature”58 
of coal mining. Church’s assertion of limited alternative male employment 
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52 Ibid., 339. 
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54 Church, The History of the British Coal Industry. Volume 3, 1830-1913, 1986, 191– 192; The 
Mines and Collieries Act of 1842 banned women and children under the age of ten from working 
underground in the mine. “Coal Mines - UK Parliament,” accessed January 22, 2015, 
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through and kept air flowing underground. For an explanation, see; Robert Colls, The Pitmen of 
the Northern Coalfield: Work, Culture, and Protest, 1790-1850 (Manchester University Press, 
1987), ix. 




suggests female employment would have been more so.59 Additionally, the 
‘hereditary nature’ of coal mining can account for the employment structure, the 
young age at which many boys started work and the predominance of related 
individuals working together. Church also claims children did not sign Bonds;60 
however we find evidence to the contrary.61  
 
Church also discusses miners’ culture. Using contemporary accounts, he claims 
they viewed mining as a skilled profession, requiring more than physical 
fitness.62 He uses this to explain why “nothing more than strength and 
experience”63 could allow a trapper to progress to a hewer in the Northeast64, 
where the coal was the most difficult to work and he must “interpret the sounds 
and smells of danger”.65 He argues these skills varied not just between mining 
districts but collieries.66 He also stresses division of labour in the Northeast- each 
man had a very specialised task.67 This begs the question of how a boy might 
gain the experience to progress in the colliery. We suggest this was done by 
working in several capacities simultaneously. This would be missed by purely 
investigating hewers. 
 
Church also addresses migration in the coalfield. He argues miners voluntarily 
migrated in search of better employment- the peak of this migration being the 
1830s and 1840s.68 He again refers to Hair’s unpublished work, which calculated 
a ten to thirty-five percent annual movement of miners from parish records. 69 
                                                 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., 260. 
61 For the purposes of this study, those under the age of 18 have been considered children. Whilst 
the age at which being considered an adult by contemporaries would likely have been younger in 
this period, there were several reasons for doing so. Firstly, boys graduated to being hewers (at 
the earliest) around the age of 18, although this was usually later. This was when they became 
truly autonomous workers, and ceased to be viewed as junior members of the colliery. Secondly, 
the majority of the income of young workers would have been contributed to their families, and 
most boys would still be living at home until they became hewers. Finally, a boy younger than 18 
would have little chance of being able to migrate to a different colliery by himself, and therefore 
was not really independent of the family unit. 
62 Church, The History of the British Coal Industry. Volume 3, 1830-1913, 1986, 203. 
63 Ibid., 206. 
64 Ibid., 205–206. 
65 Ibid., 206. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., 207–208. 
68 Ibid., 218–219. 
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Wylam’s records allow investigation of this trend by assessing the turnover of 
workers each year. Church asserts a change came about with the end of annual 
bonding.70 This meant the terms of contracts were less desirable, and in 
conjunction with smaller pits disappearing, led to less internal migration.71 He 
also tracks recruitment from other industries, and concludes that North-eastern 
mining drew in adult males in the 1830s and 1860s.72 High worker mobility 
seems to conflict with the idea that conditions in different collieries meant those 
working there for a longer period had an advantage. Either hewers did not view 
this as the case, or there were more important motivations for migration. 
 
Using Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz’s index until 1850, and G. H. Wood’s index 
in the following years73, Church determines that the real wages of hewers 
“fluctuated greatly”74 between the years 1830 and 1842 “but the average trend 
was stationary or slightly downwards”75. From 1842 to the mid-1860s Church 
sees a “critical period of improvement”76 in which earnings increased by “at least 
50 per cent”77 overall. He then uses Williamson’s average annual male earnings 
to compare miners to other industries, and concludes that of the years 1827, 
1852, 1881, and 1901, only in 1881 were miners below average.78 Whilst the 
latter estimates are beyond our study, the earlier estimates provide a point of 
comparison for our data.  
 
Church mainly addresses the wages of adult males in one mining occupation 
(hewing), and the analysis centres mainly on these wages. However he also 
highlights the difficultly in assessing women and children’s contributions to 
household income,79 but later states their participation rates were “relatively 
low”80. Instead, Church sees women’s employment as caring for lodgers, which 
                                                 
70 Ibid., 219. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid., 234. 
73 Ibid., 646–648. 
74 Ibid., 570. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid., 571. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid., 574. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid., 581. 
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provided additional income.81 There is little quantification of this type of work, 
although he does provide some limited wage estimates for junior mine workers.  
 
Church also addresses the living conditions of miners and their families’. He 
illustrates a points system for the allocation of colliery housing, based on the 
marital status and family size of hewers.82 He also discusses options for those 
who did not receive colliery housing- lodging with another miner, renting from a 
private landlord83 or becoming an “owner-occupier”.84 Wylam records only 
indicate which hewers occupied colliery housing. However they also give 
evidence of other benefits from working in the colliery, such as access to cheap 
coal and medical care. These benefits have rarely been considered in this 
literature and quantify some of the normally ‘intangible costs’ of living during 
this period. Church claims although early housing was sub-par85, after 1845 
“nearly all British miners lived in houses of stone or brick”.86 Church also claims 
miners could afford well-furnished homes, despite their dishevelled outer 
appearance.87 This implies miners possessed disposable income, and 
demonstrates how they allocated such resources. Church also discusses the diets 
of mining families, although his data are mainly from the 1870s and 1880s or 
other geographic regions, less relevant to the current study.88 More recent work 
by Horrell and Humphries includes household budgets from mining families in 
our period89, which have been used as a comparison.  
Coal Mining- the Northern Coalfield 
Flinn reports that coal had been mined from the Northeast, mainly for the 
purpose of selling in London, since the sixteenth century. This arose due to two 
main factors; the position of the coalfield near rivers which allowed easy access 
                                                 
81 Ibid., 633. 
82 Ibid., 601. 
83 Ibid., 602. 
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87 Ibid., 609. 
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24 
 
to the sea, and the ample supply of high quality coal.90 In the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries the Northeast dominated the coal market, although this 
did decline over that period- from 43.2 percent of total British coal output in 
1700, to 22.8 percent by 1830.91 However, Flinn highlights that it was still the 
biggest coal producing region in 1830 “by a significant margin”.92 Over the same 
period North-eastern output tripled, so that it was producing 6,915,000 tons per 
year by 1830,93 and was the leader “in technology, in the skill of its miners, and 
in the expertise of its managers.”94 
 
During the period of our wage study output continued to increase, so that by the 
end of our period (in 1862) the Northeast was producing around 20.9 million tons 
per year- 16 times greater than in 1700.95 However, the share the Northeast had 
of the total coal market remained the same- around 23 percent.96 It was demand 
for coal which drove this output (especially for iron manufacture97), but 
technological developments (such as the steam engine and the safety lamp which 
allowed mines to both reach deeper seams, and shift greater quantities of coal 
from the face) which facilitated this increase.98 
 
Mitchell presents statistics in his work Economic Development of the British 
Coal Industry which indicate that by 1840, 46 percent of the coal produced in 
Durham and Northumberland was consumed by the coastal trade (mainly to 
London). Just over one third was consumed locally, either by the collieries, local 
domestic consumption, or by local manufacturing. Just over one eighth of all 
North-eastern output in 1840 was exported. The remainder was consumed by 
ironworks, steamships and railways, but in 1840 this made up a relatively minor 
                                                 
90 Michael W. Flinn, The History of the British Coal Industry. Volume 2, 1700-1830 : The 
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91 Ibid., 26. 
92 Ibid., 28. 
93 Ibid., 26. 
94 Ibid., 28. 
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part of the total.99 Coastwise trade then declined to 34 percent of output by 1855, 
and 21 percent by 1869 (the next entry in Mitchell’s tables, although 7 years after 
the end of our study). The actual tonnage still increased, from 1.2 million tons in 
1840, to 5 million in 1869. Ironworks consumption grew rapidly, from 1 percent 
in 1840, to 11 percent in 1855, and to 30 percent in 1869. Railways and 
steamships had reached 4 and 5 percent respectively by 1869, but were relatively 
minor consumers overall of North-eastern output. We therefore see that whilst 
the North-eastern coalfield shipped a sizable proportion of its output to other 
parts of the country during this period, the increased consumption of the iron 
industry was also important in driving its growth.100 
 
Colls has focussed on the Northeast, especially the relationship between miners 
and owners. He also identified a trend of ethnicity in colliers during the period, 
claiming most pitmen in new collieries were “born and bred in the traditional 
areas of the coalfield”101 and it was tertiary workers who came from “rural and 
distant parts.”102 This further supports the fundamental role of the family in the 
mining industry. Colls continues to argue pitmen (underground mine workers 
who were ‘born and bred’ in the northern coalfield) considered themselves 
skilled, “taught informally, through family and friends, and guarded by the 
exclusivity of the mining community”103. Additionally, he claims the “word 
‘pitman’ carried with it meanings of social bearing: other men were ‘colliers’ 
compared to ‘pitmen’, and others again were labourers”.104 He uses evidence of 
major disasters after the importation of workers, supposedly caused by their 
inexperience of mining in the Northern coalfield, to support this claim.105 In this 
period Wylam suffered relatively few disasters in comparison to other collieries. 
However, this does not detract from the social connotations of working in the 
mine. A pitmen had a very specific identity; senior to that of a collier (a man who 
might work underground, but was not necessarily bred in the coalfield) and a 
labourer (a man who worked in the colliery, but not at the coal face). A man bred 
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in the coalfield was always a pitman, but could be distinguished by his status as 
“a middling good pitman, a thorough good pitman; and a pitman; which the latter 
are the highest degrees”.106 The wording in the Bonds can shed light on this 
division between those working at the coal face, and those employed elsewhere 
in the mine.  
 
Additionally, Colls looks at the organisation of labour. He reports that by the 
1840s boys worked a one-shift, twelve-hour day, supporting two six-hour shifts 
for hewers.107 This gives us an idea of some of the factors affecting standard-of-
living for our miners outside of their income, such as leisure time. Unfortunately 
our data contain very little information about factors such as leisure time; wages 
were mainly based on productivity, and therefore give us little indication about 
any preference for leisure rather than work, and the Bonds contain no clauses 
specifically relating to leisure. However, it is important to recall that there are 
factors affecting standard-of-living other than those which we are able to 
measure here.  
 
Colls also evaluates the worker organisations in the coalfield, and the practise of 
restriction. According to Colls, ‘The United Association of Colliers’ was the first 
formal worker organisation, established in 1825.108 He reports that “their four 
thousand hewers were not to work more than eight hours, or earn more than 4s 
6d, in a day”,109 those who did so would be fined the days’ wages.110 Whilst it is 
unknown how many of the workers at Wylam were members of these types of 
organisations, the limit of earnings can be compared to actual earnings for each 
fortnight. Colls also comments on the practise of ‘cavilling’ (drawing lots) four 
times a year, which determined where a miner worked in the mine.111 This, he 
says, meant pay became significantly influenced by “the gamble of a lottery”.112 
This helps to explain the variation in earnings of hewers during this period. Our 
data allows us to identify this practise as hewers moved around the colliery. 
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Colls also comments on the Pitmen’s Bond. He claims binding money was given 
as an incentive for hewers to sign their Bonds, usually totalling 1s or 6d.113 He 
tracks the rise in binding money up to 1804, where the demand of men for the 
Napoleonic Wars meant this sum reached as high as 20 guineas114 and the 
owners sought to place limits on it the following year.115 He then tracks the 
binding monies annually until their supposed abolishment in 1822, and the nature 
of the bindings thereafter.116 That binding money had declined by the period of 
our wage series holds particular relevance to the current study, as the large one-
off payment could make a significant difference to a workers standard-of-living. 
His identification of the Napoleonic Wars as a drain of labour also reminds us of 
the turbulent international arena in this period, and the incentives for labour 
outside of the normal working market.  
 
More recently Jaffe’s work, The Struggle for Market Power, further investigated 
labour relations in the Northeast. Jaffe claims for miners “the market was their 
industrial culture”,117 and the struggle over the terms of exchange governed 
industrial relations.118 In this interpretation, piece rates are not just pay rates, but 
expressions of relative power.119 In addition, we must see episodes of social 
unrest as additionally important, rather than simple pay disputes.120 
 
Jaffe discusses the cartel of coal owners121, and its ‘Vend’ which restricted the 
coal available to London. He claims northern coal owners had used this practise 
since the early-1700s.122 The Vend assigned volumes of coal to each colliery, and 
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thus restricted output.123 This became more regularly administrated after 1829.124 
Jaffe demonstrates the cartel was dependent on the large coal owners- with its 
collapses in 1828, 1832 and 1844 after key withdrawals.125 He highlights the 
Vend was also broken on other occasions.126 The Vend had a direct effect on 
miners’ pay; as a colliery neared its quota, production ceased, and miners could 
not work. Collieries would cease production for three days, re-start for a day, 
before ceasing again. This avoided having to compensate miners if no work was 
available for four days or more, or allow them to seek employment elsewhere (as 
mandated by the Bond).127 This helps explain some of the fluctuations in Wylam 
miners’ wages. 
 
Jaffe argues as working costs were high for the coal industry, it was imperative 
to reduce wages as far as possible.128 This was done by “the imposition of 
fines”129 on hewers.130 However, whilst hewers were the main source of wage-
expenditure, there appears to have been relatively minimal effort in controlling 
the wages of other occupations. The present study considers workers in other 
occupations who were not subjected to this practise, as fines applied mainly to 
the work of hewers.131 
 
Jaffe claims the separation of ownership and management of the colliery was key 
in maintaining labour relations. Disputes were between management (viewers) 
and workers, meaning owners could maintain a paternalistic relationship with 
their workforce.132 Partly motivated by unrest in the 1820s, he claims this 
relationship meant owners were keen to house, educate and cultivate religion in 
their workers.133 Jaffe argues that school-building peaked in the Northern 
coalfield during the 1840s, as a result of owner paternalism, and a reaction by the 
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Church of England to Methodism.134 Wylam’s Bonds fit with this timeline, 
demanding compulsory contributions to a colliery school from the 1840s.  
 
Jaffe also claims women’s participation was far lower in County Durham in 1841 
than the national average (seventeen to twenty-six percent).135 He claims 
whenever they did work, this was primarily in domestic service136, or as 
“dressmakers, milliners, agricultural laborers, schoolmistresses, and publicans or 
innkeepers.”137 He compares this to a highly mobile male labour market, with a 
high rate of internal migration- although this is based on Flinn’s work, and not an 
independent corroboration.138 The role of women is not fully understood from the 
wage data from Wylam. There is little evidence of their employment in the 
colliery. One however must query Jaffe’s alternative employments. In one 
mining village, there could only have been so many ‘dressmakers’, 
‘schoolmistresses’, ‘innkeepers’ or ‘milliners’. The Blackett estate may have 
meant agriculture was a possibility. However this was hardly a stable occupation, 
and suffered large seasonal variations. Domestic service therefore seems the 
most likely scenario. This was mainly caring for lodgers in the family home. This 
may be reinforced by the relatively few hewers identified by the paybills as 
receiving colliery housing, and would therefore likely have lodged in the village. 
 
Jaffe also challenges Colls’ interpretation of earning restriction. He uses 
contemporary accounts to suggest it was forced upon the unions by workers 
rather than the trade unions attempting to stop competition between hewers.139 
Jaffe says workers believed restriction created more jobs in the colliery, and 
reduced its output- therefore being active on more days the year despite the 
Vend.140 The idea of creating more jobs certainly seems to fit with other 
evidence. Pitmen frequently expressed worries of an influx of labour from other 
industries, and the scarcity of work.141 The latter purpose means Jaffe is 
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suggesting miners were unable to save or stockpile resources. By spacing out the 
work they ensured a steadier stream of income, but not a higher level- unless 
they expected other miners to be capable of earning over the threshold regularly. 
This rests upon how significant different skill levels were to earnings, and if 
wage fluctuations affected spending differently to how annual absolute levels 
would suggest. 
 
We have therefore seen that coal mining has an established literature, both in the 
Northeast and nationally. North-eastern labour relations were incredibly 
complex- an intricate interplay between owners, viewers and workers. The 
impact of this, and the Bond, on workers is still not completely understood- from 
its effect on migration to the general level of wages. Additionally, the role of 
women and children in the family economy requires further investigation.  
Wylam Colliery 
Information describing the history of Wylam itself is relatively scarce; it is 
perhaps best known for being the home of railway engineer George Stephenson, 
and one of the earliest places to employ locomotive technology.142 The latter was 
mainly thanks to the interest of the Blackett family in financing and developing 
such innovations.143 The village is said to have been “almost entirely occupied by 
coal-miners and iron-furnacemen”144 and containing “nothing to interest”145 the 
observer. However, the presence of a colliery and ironworks resulted in a 
relatively large population relative to a typical mining village.146 Whilst the 
presence of iron manufacture in Wylam would have had an effect on all 
industrial activities, the insular nature of the coal trade discussed above would 
have caused a degree of isolation between the two.  
 
Kirby, who compiled the paybills from the colliery at Wylam, has used this data 
to assess productivity of these miners. He argues absences from work were not 
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motivated by laziness, but the physical demands of hewing147- emphasising by 
“the mid-century, a hewer might cut between 2.5 and four tons of coal per 
day.”148 He suggested shorter working weeks by the 1840s were “a response to 
rising fatigue”.149 Kirby also examines the motivations of hewers. He cites a 
study by Liddell of absences of Durham miners, which claims single men lost 2.7 
weeks, married men (with no children) 2.1 and married men (with one child) 1.8 
per year,150 although these data are from 1946-49151, significantly later than 
Kirby’s own study. Kirby performed his own analysis on 1700 entries from the 
Wylam paybills, finding householders produced around ten percent more coal 
daily than non-householders in the period 1839-58.152 
 
Kirby also analysed the representativeness of Wylam colliery compared to the 
rest of the northern coalfield. He argues in “1800, the colliery employed around 
100 workers […] 215 by 1838, and between 1854 and 1861 the figure stood 
around 205. By comparison, a survey in 1842 of the 46 principal collieries in the 
district provided an average workforce of about 225.”153 He also suggests some 
problems with the data, which we will later discuss in greater depth. He claims a 
“missing hewer might be working in a different seam or a different pit within the 
colliery (for which a paybill has not survived) or he might be employed as a 
putter or in off-hand work elsewhere”.154 All these points aid the present 
investigation. 
 
Kirby’s work suggested possible motivations for the work ethic of Wylam 
hewers, in addition to potential flaws of the data of this study. He also examines 
Wylam colliery, tracking its size throughout the period. However, his work has 
focussed on the productivity of these miners, rather than their absolute wage 
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levels. Additionally, he has focussed only on hewers, rather than the wide range 
of occupations his data provide. 
 
In conclusion to this section, the present study addresses the absolute level of 
wages and the role of the family in coal mining literature of the Northeast, as 
well as contributing to our understanding of the complex owner-worker relations 
in the Northern coalfield. In this it fits with the contributions of Church and 
Colls, and to a lesser extent, Jaffe. It aims to consider ‘the family’, in addition to 
the ‘male worker’, and the consequences of decisions and events on the family 
economy. Whilst the system of employment in the Northern coalfield was 
somewhat different to elsewhere in the country, it also has relevance to coal 
miners in general. This study also has implications outside of its geographic 
bounds. Berg and Hudson have argued that regional history has much to 
contribute to the general debate around the Industrial Revolution, and even Crafts 
and Harley have acknowledged its merits. The wage series created by this study 
can be used in comparison to more general literature on the nature and causes of 
the Industrial Revolution. Allen’s (and to some extent, Humphries’) work relies 
on the idea of British workers being well off; if coal miners turn out to have had 
very different fortunes then this impacts on the strength of this school-of-thought 
in general. Additionally, the real wages calculated by this study can be compared 
to the aggregate estimates of Lindert and Williamson, and Feinstein, in order to 




The main data for this study are c. 16,000 paybills from Wylam colliery. These 
are drawn from an existing dataset of c. 60,000 entries. The paybills are 
fortnightly records which recorded the ‘scores of tubs’ a hewer produced, and 
therefore the compensation he was owed. Putters were also paid by a piece rate. 
Drivers, trappers and many other workers were paid by a daily rate. All these 
data are named, allowing the reconstruction of employment histories. The dataset 
was created by Professor Peter Kirby, who has kindly agreed for its repurposing 
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in the present investigation. The original work was entitled ‘Productivity and 
Household Economy in a Tyneside Mining Community, 1775-1861’ and was 
obtained through the UK Data Service155. This was originally transcribed from 
the paybills of Wylam Colliery maintained in the Blackett collection at the 
Northumberland Archives, Ashington.  
 
Wylam Colliery was located around ten miles west of Newcastle, in the modern 
day county of Northumberland. It was the most westerly of the Tyneside 
collieries.156 The Blackett family owned the manor on which the colliery 
developed, until it passed into the hands of the Wylam Coal Company in the 
1880s.157 Christopher Blackett, who owned the colliery in the early 1800s, was a 
keen financier of locomotive technology, and financed the development of the 
‘Puffing Billy’ and the ‘Wylam Dilly’158. The main players in the Northern 
coalfield were the Marquis of Londonderry and the Earl of Durham159, and from 
1820, the Hetton Coal Company.160 Wylam was one of the few collieries owned 
by an independent family, although the Blacketts did own mines in other areas; 
specifically mining lead in the Pennines161. The Bonds indicate they briefly 
acquired the nearby Prudhoe colliery in 1839, but this disappears from the 
records by 1856. Data survive for five of the pits at Wylam Colliery (Ann, 
Haugh, Peggy, Prosperous, and Tyne) although there were around ten operating 
over the period of the nineteenth century.162 
 
The paybills form the central part of the present study. They show the amount of 
wages miners received after the deductions of fines and other charges necessary 
for their work. These were expenses such as ‘Fire Coal’ (coal provided for 
personal usage at a cheap rate), ‘Candles’, ‘Powder’ (gunpowder), ‘Picksharper’ 
(the fee for sharpening pickaxes) and their contributions to ‘Surgeons’, or 
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medical care. These data are especially rich; they list the amount earned by the 
worker, his occupation, the seam and pit in which he was working at the time, 
any deductions from his pay, and if he worked “in the broken”163 or participated 
in “wet work”164. Kirby has been able to reconstruct the productivity of each 
worker down to a fortnightly level165, but this richness of data has also allowed 
the present study to reconstruct the employment histories of individual workers 
on a fortnightly basis for extended periods. Some workers have employment 
histories that span decades, starting from when they began work in junior 
capacities to achieving the prestigious role of a hewer. 
 
The detailed breakdown of occupations is important due to the focus of the 
present study on the family, rather than just the male breadwinner. Thanks to the 
age structure of mining, we can use these occupations to reconstruct potential 
earnings at different stages of childhood, in addition to as an adult. There are 
several different defined occupations working in collieries at this point. Whilst 
different collieries have different terminologies and specific duties for these job 
roles, they compare to any other coal mine in the country. The elite workers were 
referred to as ‘hewers’. These were the men who actually worked the coal face, 
traditionally using a pick-axe, although gunpowder became increasingly popular 
during this period.166 Hewers were usually over twenty-one167, having worked 
their way up through the mine in various occupations.168 ‘Putters’ were next in 
the hierarchy. They transported the coal (either pushing or pulling) between the 
hewers at the face, and the drivers on the rolley ways.169 They tended to be 
teenage boys170, who would look to progress to hewing as they aged. ‘Drivers’ 
were yet another step more junior. They transported tubs along the main ‘rolley 
way’ (underground road) out of the mine. This was usually done using horses, 
which had a tendency to rear and buck underground, so this required good 
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physical strength.171 They were often defined as “boys”.172 Finally, ‘trappers’ 
were the youngest underground workers. They opened and closed the trap doors 
for the tubs to move through and keep air flowing underground.173 Church 
assigns more concrete age definitions to these workers, citing an account of 
George Johnson (a 1830s viewer in the Northeast174). He defines trappers as 
twelve to fourteen, drivers as stronger twelve to fourteen year olds, putters as 
fifteen to twenty-two or twenty-three, and hewers from twenty-three onwards.175 
Church additionally claims it was customary for hewers to move out of that 
occupation should they reach fifty-five, to less physical work.176 
 
Kirby records twenty-one different occupations in his database (including those 
aforementioned)177, but it is these four which this study focusses on. Most 
existing quantitative studies have focussed only on hewers’ wage rates178, even 
going as far to exclude “putter-hewers”179. This study is more expansive, 
considering more occupations. Hewers and putters have been included for the 
most obvious reasons. They were integral to the mining process, and constituted 
the majority of workers. Additionally, they were the central workers to the 
Pitmen’s Bond180, which governed the terms of labour throughout the Northern 
coalfield.181 They were also paid by a piece rate, meaning that their incomes 
were potentially the most varied during this period. Drivers and trappers are 
included as they provide an insight into the types of work and the potential 
earnings of child labourers, and were also included in the binding process on 
many occasions. 
 
The main task of this study has been to arrange the existing wage entries 
(containing all of the information listed above) into employment histories of 
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individual workers. These entries are all contained in Kirby’s data set, arranged 
chronologically. Whilst this provides an excellent snapshot of the pay and 
productivity in a mine in any individual fortnight, it fails to indicate long running 
trends concerning individual workers. To assess the movement of workers’ 
wages over the year (and in subsequent years), it was necessary not only to 
identify their ongoing earnings, but also any work in other occupations which 
boosted their usual income- lower earnings in one fortnight could be accounted 
for by time being allocated to another occupation. This study has therefore built 
upon Kirby’s work by constructing these employment histories for a sample of 
workers selected from this data set. The runs of data have also been separated by 
Bond year, rather than simply calendar year, as it was these dates for which 
earnings would be governed by the same contract. For the years of the Monthly 
Bond, calendar years have been used. The entries for each fortnight in an 
individual’s Bond year were then used in the calculation of average earnings and 
standard deviations of earnings. 
 
Unfortunately, the records themselves do not cover all workers at Wylam as 
records for all seams and pits have not survived. However, this should have no 
more of an effect than sampling the surviving records themselves. Despite the 
rich nature of these data, they are not completely continuous. This could be for 
several reasons. Firstly, wage entries could be missing due to workers being on 
strike. This occurred particularly widely in 1831-32 and 1844 when there were 
coalfield-wide labour movements and co-ordinated strike action.182 Whilst the 
employment of strike-breakers may have meant that the colliery was not forced 
to cease production, the usual roster of hewers would be absent and gaps in their 
employment histories would appear.183 Secondly, some of the wage records have 
not survived or been transcribed. This means that we have no record of some 
seams at all, and we lose track of miners should they move into one of these 
seams, as frequently occurred. Workers also appear to have picked up shifts in 
other capacities on a relatively frequent basis. Due to this habit, it is also possible 
that records of a portion of some workers earnings may have been lost. As this 
was on an ad hoc basis, it should not seriously affect the results as this probably 
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accounted for a relatively small amount of consistent earnings. There are 
occasions where a worker is listed with a pit but no seam in the records, but very 
rarely the reverse.  
 
The Bond year 1836-1837 is the most problematic. This is at the very beginning 
of our wage series, and contains fewer entries due to the loss of records. As will 
be discussed in the migration section, this has resulted in an over-estimation of 
new workers in 1837-1838. However, this does not necessarily detract from other 
measures for that year- for example, average wage levels should still hold 
validity. The sample size is far bigger in subsequent years, but does not exceed 
56 entries for hewers in any year. The sampling procedure means that if any 
hewer was included he would also feature in any subsequent years he worked.  
 
An additional issue was the practice of working in a ‘gang’ or with ‘partners’. 
Here, only the lead name was recorded in the paybill. In the case of hewers 
working with partners, it has generally been assumed that the partner was a 
family relation who was been taken into the mine to learn the trade, and the 
income was all going into the same household anyway.184 Whilst there 
undoubtedly would have been exceptions, there appears no other way of dealing 
with this problem bar excluding these data entirely. Identifying these fortnights 
has been difficult, but a judgement has been made based on their relative levels 
to other fortnights (especially those in close proximity) and average earnings as a 
whole. Employment histories containing entries of this nature have been clearly 
marked in the data, and excluded from calculations.  
 
For those working on miscellaneous tasks in a gang, the issue becomes more 
problematic. There appears to be no way of distinguishing which workers took 
part other than the named payee. These entries have therefore been excluded 
from calculations concerning average earnings. They have been retained in the 
employment histories for the purpose of investigating the secondary 
employments of workers. Whilst it is unfortunate to exclude wage data on a 
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selective basis, including gang working in the earnings of one individual would 
unnecessarily elevate the average earnings for that individual in the given year, 
and present false results. Whilst this has resulted in the individuals’ earnings 
being obscured, his wages for other fortnights allows us to calculate his income 
were he to have worked the entire year in his normal capacity. 
 
A further issue evolved by strictly assigning a worker to an occupation- workers 
were often involved in other occupations in the colliery in addition to their main 
employment. For example, young boys often worked the ‘switches’ in addition to 
trapping. In these cases, earnings outside of their primary occupation have been 
retained in the dataset. This is in order to capture an accurate reflection of the 
types and amount of work available to miners during this period. To ignore 
additional income purely because it fails to fall into an assessed category would 
misrepresent the earnings of workers during this period.  
 
Additionally, this study makes use of the ‘Pitmen’s Bond’, which governed the 
terms of employment in the mines during this period. The Bonds contain 
information on piece rates in each year, the rights provided to workers, and the 
costs and fines which they were required to comply with throughout the year. 
The Bond guaranteed that any individual who signed it would remain in the 
employ of the colliery to which he was contracted, unless meeting certain 
conditions specified by the terms of the Bond itself. They provide a valuable 
insight into the labour relations of the period (including the rights which 
everyday miners were able to attain), some of the fixed costs of working in a 
mine (along with the standard pay-rate, even if this was then influenced by 
productivity) and the structure of labour in the coalfield. Wylam’s Bonds survive 
from as early as 1794. They are sporadic until the beginning of our period of 
study. They then run continuously from 1837 until 1844, when they ceased to be 
annual documents upon the introduction of the Monthly Bond. Wylam has two 
examples of the Monthly Bond; on its introduction in April 1844, and February 
1847. We then see the introduction of a semi-annual Bond in April 1856, and the 
return of annual bonding in April 1857. This runs until the end of our study in 




Miners could be imprisoned for breaking their Bond.185 These documents were 
usually re-negotiated on a yearly basis, but became monthly contracts from 1844 
until they were reinstated- at the behest of the miners- in the 1850s.186 The 
signing of the Bonds, or ‘binding’ of colliers, underwent changes over the period 
of this study; moving from an alcohol fuelled event to a more professional and 
respectable process by the mid-1800s.187  
 
The date of the binding determined whether the miners or the owners held the 
power over negotiations. Bindings in high demand seasons (such as October) 
meant that the workers were able to exert considerable pull over the terms of the 
Bond, but spring or summer bindings placed this power the hands of the mine 
owners and their viewer representatives.188 However, this was not the only 
consideration- the 1810 strike was due to owners wanting to move the binding 
from October to January, finally settled by the workers agreeing on April.189 By 
moving the binding to after the season of peak demand, the workers appear to 
have sacrificed much of their power in negotiations- even a January binding 
would have meant a greater demand for coal than an April one. Therefore, there 
must have been some other motivation; Colls argues workers did not want to be 
taken away from their families (the binding process often involved workers 
spending several days in Newcastle) in the peak of winter.190  
 
Generally, as demonstrated by the dates of Wylam’s Bonds (see appendix), 
bindings occurred in April during our period. These were frequently the 
opportunities that workers took to strike. By refusing to sign a new Bond, a 
worker protected himself from the legal ramifications of breaking his contract, 
and at the same time exerted his influence over the colliery owners. For this to be 
effective mass actions were required, and due to the cross-coalfield nature of the 
Bond (and its attempts at standardisation) this necessitated miners across the 
Northern coalfield to act in a unified manner. This necessitated the development, 
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organisation and administration of coalfield-wide labour movements.191 It also 
meant that owners could try and break strikes by offering terms to individual 
collieries which would entice them back to work. This was especially effective 
during long strikes when workers were at the point of exhaustion. Of course, it 
also had the adverse effect of breaking the united nature of the owners and 
allowing some workers to win preferable terms.192 Indeed, in one case workers 
were able to win the desired terms in individual collieries, return to work, and 
use their pay to fund friendly societies for workers at other collieries still on 
strike.193 
 
It was common practice for a colliery to provide ‘binding money’ as an incentive 
for workers to sign a Bond during this period.194 Flinn’s work indicates this 
reached a peak in 1804 as a result of the Napoleonic Wars drawing men from the 
workforce.195 However, Colls’ research demonstrates that by the period of the 
present study binding money had generally been reduced to a relatively nominal 
amount- around 1s.196 This has therefore reduced the need of the present study to 
account for such income. Whilst different men signing at different times were 
paid differing amounts197, the effect of this amount of money on annual earnings 
would be very minimal. 
 
Piece rates were negotiated at the yearly binding. They varied from colliery to 
colliery198, although there were attempts towards the middle of the nineteenth 
century to standardise rates throughout the coalfield. This was successful in the 
rates of putters, drivers and trappers199, but not so for hewers.200 Hewers’ piece 
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rates could also vary within the colliery for the type of work undertaken. 
Working ‘in the broken’ could generally attract higher rates due to its added 
danger.201 The Bonds have been used to gather these piece rates for each year at 
Wylam colliery. These are useful for several reasons. Firstly, miners did not have 
the luxury of hindsight. In other words, they could not calculate how much they 
would be able to earn in a year, as this varied significantly due to a number of 
factors in the mine.202 They therefore would judge the attractiveness of 
opportunities based on the piece rates they were offered. Secondly, piece rates 
provide a rough guide to labour relations in each year- a suppression of piece 
rates would suggest the ownership gaining power, and an increase, the reverse.  
 
Using piece rates to try to calculate wages is problematic, as there were too many 
unknown variables- such as working in the broken or wet work (which yielded 
different rates), fines (which deducted earnings for supposed poor workmanship) 
and costs (such as pick sharpening or buying gunpowder). This means we should 
be cautious about using changes in piece rates to explain trends in wages and 
migration. However, as previously mentioned, they were the only guide which 
the average hewer had. Used in conjunction with our knowledge of average 
wages for the year as a whole, they can help to explain changes in wages and the 
actions of some workers- such as moving away from the mine in search of more 
valuable work. This has impacted on our analysis of migration. 
 
The Bonds contained many rights which might seem out of place in the 
conditions of a nineteenth century coal mine. Clauses guaranteed workers a 
minimum income per fortnight. This has been investigated in relation to the 
seemingly low average earnings of hewers in our research. Housing was also 
frequently mentioned in the Bonds. Whether this was at the expense of the 
colliery or the miner, hewers were entitled to colliery housing, sometimes being 
compensated if they took lodging elsewhere. The condition in which this housing 
was to be kept was also agreed upon. The literature has not been kind to the 
standard of colliery owned housing during this period, and has criticised it for 
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problems with sanitation and access to water.203 However, it was viewed by 
colliery owners as a vital means for maintaining control over their workers204, 
and must have factored in decisions such as migration for the average miner. 
 
Access to medical care was also established, although data from the paybills 
indicate miners were required to make fortnightly contributions to its cost. This 
was constant throughout the period at 6 pence per fortnight. Bonds do not 
mention ‘Friendly Societies’ as these were worker led organisations, designed to 
aid those in need due to illness or injury, or in more extreme cases those on 
strike. However, it is likely that most miners did make contributions from their 
fortnightly wages to these societies.205 Ideally, further investigation would have 
been undertaken into societies with the aim of discerning which hewers from 
Wylam might have been members. However, the relatively minor influence 
contributions had on fortnightly wages means it would not have drastically 
affected income. Membership of Friendly Societies may indicate a certain ability 
to provision, and therefore imply a certain standard-of-living, but they should be 
seen in the overall context. The uncertainty surrounding the availability of work 
in the coal industry meant that families required some form of income stream 
during work stoppages or strike action, as occurred on a relatively frequent basis. 
Therefore, whilst membership of such organisations may well reflect standard-
of-living, they should be seen as having greater economic necessity in the coal 
trade than in other industries. 
 
The report of the 1842 Commission lists contributions to friendly societies as 
around 1s.3d. per month206, (7.5 pence per fortnight). This is not enough to 
significantly change our understanding of monthly expenditure, but this value 
gives us an idea of the potential amount of earnings allocated to these types of 
organisations. We have also investigated the effects of unions on earnings 
through an evaluation of restriction, and how much of an issue it was in the 
productivity of hewers, by comparing the daily rate of restriction to the earnings 
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of individuals. Other deductions were taken from hewers’ earnings in this period, 
such as compulsory contributions for a colliery school from the 1840s. 
 
The Bonds also clearly set out the fines to which a hewer could be subjected 
during his employment. With the autonomy of the worker at the coal face, it was 
a means of maintaining control at the source of production.207 Fines could be 
levied for a variety of reasons. Larger chunks of coal were seen to be more 
valuable than smaller chunks, and therefore fines were imposed should a hewer 
not produce coal of a reasonable size. If there was a particular proportion of 
‘chaff’ or rotten coal in a corf, then the hewer would not be paid for that tub.208 A 
frequent objection of hewers was that they could be fined for light tubs, when the 
coal had been lost after it had left their possession- in the transportation by the 
putters or drivers.209 These fines have been accounted for in calculations of 
hewers’ wages in some of the literature, but awareness of them is relevant to not 
just the level of income of a hewer, but also the relationship between owner and 
worker.  
 
Unfortunately, whilst we can account for the cost of the various benefits in the 
paybills, this is not possible for fines. These were deducted from the hewers’ 
wage, and not listed as a separate value in our data. Whilst this is problematic for 
assessing the impact of fines, it does mean that the wage values calculated by this 
study more accurately represent the income of mining families, by accounting for 
these deductions in overall earnings. 
 
In summary, these data are unique in many respects. Their detail provide us with 
a rare opportunity to track the earnings of workers not only on an annual but on a 
fortnightly basis. This allows us to investigate how fortnightly fluctuations in 
wages might have affected standard-of-living. It also allows us to evaluate how 
large those fluctuations might have been, and how regularly they occurred. We 
can also assess if it affected particular occupations more heavily than others. The 
range and depth of occupations contained in the data provide a rare opportunity. 
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This allows us to move away from the practice of the literature to comment only 
on the earnings of hewers, and move into the realm of the family economy. 
Named data in conjunction with these occupations can allow us to start 
reconstructing families, and assess how important the family unit was to the 
mining industry. We can then use data concerning average family size, in 
conjunction with the average earnings of different occupations, to discover what 
the annual income of a mining family might have been. Additionally, the use of 
employment histories lets us compare the earnings of different hewers over 
different periods, with the aim of establishing the amount of skill or luck in 
determining hewers’ wages. 
 
Methodology 
The data have been sampled, reducing the original investigation to around 30,000 
entries. The data were selected by surname, in order to include all paybills for an 
individual. All entries for A, C, E, G, I, J, K, M, O, R, T, V and Y were 
originally included. There were no entries for Q, X or Z, meaning sampling 
pattern was altered. Where misspellings, names queried by the transcriber or 
transcription errors occurred, a judgement was made to place the entry in the 
most suitable category. For example, a name originally transcribed as ‘Arnting 
[Errington]’ was assumed to be part of the earnings of ‘George Errington’ and 
moved accordingly. 
 
Data were then grouped into those entries which were under the same name. 
Some discretion was used here; for example ‘Wm’ and ‘William’ were assumed 
to be the same unless the pattern of wage entries indicated otherwise- for 
instance, one person working in the same occupation 60 years apart was 
considered to be unlikely. Groupings were then separated into individual 
workers, if there were multiple men with the same name. This required 
individual analysis of each entry. This was not as simple as it may appear, and 




Firstly, transcription errors occurred in the digitalisation of these data. Whilst 
some mistakes immediately appeared as a discrepancy, others were not so self-
evident. For example, a series may seem perfectly normal, with various gaps, 
with the first name ‘Jos’ (Joseph). However on combining this series with one of 
the first name ‘Jas’ (James) and the same surname, occasional entries fit better in 
the other series to which the name might suggest (either by the pit and seam in 
which the worker was employed, the occupation undertaken, or if one series had 
multiple entries for the same fortnight). If entries seemed to perfectly fit in a 
different series, then it was assumed an error had occurred, and the entry moved. 
It has not been possible to check all of these entries against the original 
documents, but a sample were found to confirm these assertions. 
 
Additionally, problems occurred when a father and son worked together in the 
mine. Frequently, they would work in the same pit and seam, often both as 
hewers (there was only one occurrence of a father and son working in another 
occupation, as men usually became hewers in their early twenties). In many cases 
the records indicated ‘Jr’ and ‘Sr’ (or some other variant) but where this was not 
the case other identifying factors were sought; for example one of the men may 
consistently have taken ‘Fire coal’ (charged against his name in the pay book) 
identifying him from the other. If no identifying factor was found then paybills 
were assigned in a manner which reflected identifiable earnings- if one man was 
seen to consistently earn more than the other, then unidentifiable earnings were 
assigned in the same way, if earnings were consistently similar then the paybills 
were assigned in a way which would reflect this also. This may have had the 
effect of removing some of the variation in the data from the two entries, but this 
technique was seen to preserve the initial trends as much as possible, and 
therefore was deemed to be the most suitable manner in which to process these 
data. We have therefore been able to construct highly detailed employment 
histories of individual workers throughout the years of our wage series, and 
evaluate the fluctuations in their fortnightly wages, as well as their absolute wage 
levels. 
 
When a father and son were not working in the same pit or seam, no such textual 
indicator was noted. This caused problems for tracking the movements of hewers 
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after the drawing of lots and odd shifts being taken in a different seam. These 
paybills were assigned based on any discernible patterns- which may have 
caused some entries to be assigned incorrectly, however this should effect a 
relatively small number of entries. A similar problem arose when one also had a 
paybill for another occupation. Here it often became impossible to determine 
who had completed the work. Unless patterns in the data indicated otherwise, the 
procedure was therefore to assign the multiple employments in such a way as to 
equalise earnings. Again, this would have created some errors, but these should 
be relatively minimal. Additionally, in this scenario the income should have still 
all been going to the same family. 
 
Frequently it was found that one of a father and son would eventually drop out of 
the wage records. This could have been because of death, incapacitating illness, 
moving on to other employment or retirement. Without analysis of parish records 
or census information it is almost impossible to determine which of the men this 
might have been. For the purposes of this study it was assumed that ‘Jr’ 
continued his employment in the mine. This is by no means a perfect assumption. 
Similarly, if ‘Jr’ could not be tracked in his progression to a hewer it was 
assumed that his father was the first worker. Whilst these assumptions may mean 
that the exact history of each employee may actually be a composite of two 
employees (the father and the son), at this stage family histories are not being 
reconstructed and therefore this would have a minimal effect on wage trends. 
 
At this point, it became necessary to further refine the sample. This was done by 
evaluating the representativeness of the runs of data. The fewest possible weeks 
in a period was thirteen (for semi-annual Bonds), with a maximum of twenty-six 
(for annual Bonds). If a run of wage data failed to cover five fortnights for an 
individual, the sample was deemed too small and the worker excluded. For 
shorter Bond periods, this minimum of five entries was still maintained. 
Weaknesses of these data have been identified and included in the analysis. 
 
The spread of data was then evaluated. It became clear from this analysis that the 
sample included far more entries from the latter portion of the period than the 
earlier, with a large gap between the two groups of data. The decision was 
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therefore taken to refine wage analysis to the period of the late 1830s to the early 
1860s. As most of our other avenues of investigation were dependent upon this 
wage data, they were also restricted accordingly. However, it was felt important 
to place this period in the overall picture, and so this has been done wherever 
possible. This reduced the present sample to around 16,000 entries. 
 
Analysis of the Pitmen’s Bonds was also undertaken. Each year the worker and 
his occupation were recorded, and transcribed by Kirby210. Having taken Kirby’s 
entries, we have assembled them into employment histories of individual 
workers. Clashes demonstrated men with the same name working that year. This 
was then cross-referenced with the wage histories to ensure paybills had been 
divided correctly. Kirby’s transcription included the years of the Bonds, but not 
the dates they were valid between. A timeline of Wylam’s Bonds was therefore 
established from the original documents (see appendix). 
 
During this process, the Bonds of most men corresponded to the occupation they 
fulfilled in the paybills. However this was sometimes not the case. This could 
have been either because the wage and Bond entries were in fact two different 
people, or the man in question did not work the job he signed to do. We assert 
the latter. Firstly, taking some work in other occupations was common practice- 
this will be later demonstrated by this study. We find junior workers would fill in 
if a man was taken sick, injured or absent. Therefore, should an incident occur- 
for example a death- it is likely a junior worker would take his place. 
Additionally we know men were prepared to undertake other miscellaneous 
work, should they deem it profitable. Therefore, should a man find more 
attractive work elsewhere in the mine, it does not seem a stretch for him to 
simply cease his original task. Finally, the labour Vend limited the number of 
hewers a colliery could bind. Employing other workers (or unbound labourers) in 
a hewing capacity could circumvent this system, and increase output. The system 
of vending labour itself, this was always secondary to the vending of coal, 
designed to control binding money more than anything else. Additionally, whilst 
the coal Vend was usually adhered to, preventing the movement of labour was 
                                                 
210 Kirby, “Productivity and Household Economy in a Tyneside Mining Community, 1774-1867.” 
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not well enforced, and was ignored when it suited colliery owners after its 
introduction in 1805. By the period of our study, this agreement had become 
obsolete.211 The labour Vend therefore had a limited impact, but collieries could 
still employ unbound labours at times when they needed to increase their output. 
 
Usually if a man had pay entries but no Bond, it was because the Bonds for that 
year do not survive or remain un-transcribed. With the establishment of Monthly 
Bonds from 1844 until 1854, very little data is present in the Blackett records. It 
was also common for men to have Bonds for years for which they did not have 
accompanying wages. This was due to the loss of records for many pits of 
Wylam. 
 
Having used the Bonds and paybills to reconstruct individual employment 
histories, the average wage of each worker for every individual Bond year was 
calculated. This was done by dividing total wages earned by the number of 
fortnights present for each worker, to give a ‘wage per fortnight’ total. Fortnights 
of zero earnings were included to preserve the uncertainty of wages. Further 
calculations were then made in order to produce the following: 
 
1. Average earnings for each worker based on each Bond year (in the period 
of Monthly Bonds, the calendar year was used). 
2. The standard deviation of each individual’s earnings throughout this year 
(in other words, how hewer’s wages fluctuated over the year). 
3. The average earnings for each occupation in each Bond year. 
4. The standard deviation of average earnings for each occupation in each 
Bond year (for example, how deviated the average of an individual 
hewers’ annual earnings were from the average of all hewers over the 
same period). 
5. The average standard deviation of earnings for each occupation in each 
Bond year (how much, on average, a miners’ wage would differ from the 
average each fortnight). 
                                                 
211 Colls, The Pitmen of the Northern Coalfield, 79; Flinn, The History of the British Coal 
Industry. Volume 2, 1700-1830, 1984, 356; Jaffe, The Struggle for Market Power, 76. 
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6. The standard deviation of the standard deviation of earnings. Whilst point 
two demonstrates how varied an individuals’ wages were over a year, this 
measure captures how much this variation varied.  
 
Whilst the aforementioned calculations have provided the majority of the data for 
this study, it has been necessary to quantitatively investigate other factors such as 
migration and skill level. Specific methodologies have been included in these 




The General Pattern of Wages 
The first section of our analysis considers the general pattern of wages 
throughout the period of our data for hewers, putters, and other occupations. It 
looks to establish the general trends, and explain why these may have occurred. 
Hewers 
The first question for any wage study is usually ‘is there a trend over time?’ In 
this case, the answer is ‘yes, but not a strictly linear one’. Graph 1 shows the raw 
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scatter plot of all average wages by year for hewers. Wages climb from the first 
year (1836-1837) until 1840-1841. There is then a gap, but when we re-join the 
series in 1843-1844 it has dropped to its lowest level. It then climbs again from 
1843-1844 until 1847, then declines until 1852. It then climbs until a peak at 
1855, where it begins falling again. There is another gap in the data from 1857 
until 1859, but when it re-appears in 1860-1861, it is declining again, although 
the clustering is far less close. This shows that the general level of wages 
fluctuated throughout the period of the late 1830s to the early 1860s, which 
would be missed by simply aggregating results at various intervals.  
An examination of average wages further illustrates this trend. This is plotted 
(with upper and lower bounds of one standard deviation from the mean) in graph 
2. The average wage fluctuated from 295 pence per fortnight (in 1843-1844) to 
469 pence per fortnight (in 1855). From graph 3 we see the standard deviation of 
these wages decreased in the early part of the period, and increased from 1852 
onwards. This shows wages initially became less, and then more, varied. 
Average wages still show a clear cyclical trend; rising and falling over time. This 
tells us much more than simply comparing our first and last estimates. Indeed, 
the average of 351 pence per fortnight in 1836-1837 compared to the 346 pence 
per fortnight in 1861-1862 would lead us to believe wages were static throughout 




There are several important questions here that warrant further examination. 
Firstly, why might the overall level of hewers’ wages have remained stagnant 
between 1836 and 1862? Secondly, why might they have undergone cyclical 
fluctuations over several years? Thirdly, why were they more divergent at the 
end of the period? Whilst they are all interlinked, let us consider each in turn. 
 
The main working cost of the coal industry was wages,212 which therefore had to 
be reduced as much as possible, in order to maximise profits. Unionised miners 
had won strike victories in 1831, only to feel the full wrath of the owners in 
1832, and the following depression of wages. Strikes in 1844 ended in defeat for 
the miners, leading to the introduction of the Monthly Bond.213 By this point, the 
owners- wary of the now national mining trade union- wanted the ability to 
change the terms of work at a months’ notice and the tighter control over the 
workforce such power provided.214 The workers favoured a six-month Bond, 
which would put them in a better negotiating position, along with various 
guarantees and insurances on their work.215 With the victory of the owners, it is 
unsurprising wages failed to gain ground over the later-1840s, although more 
favourable terms in the 1847 Bond did cause temporary wage increases in the 
                                                 
212 Church, The History of the British Coal Industry. Volume 3, 1830-1913, 1986, 501. 
213 Colls, The Pitmen of the Northern Coalfield, 92–98, 296–301. 
214 Ibid., 71, 73. 
215 Ibid., 100. 
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middle years of the decade (before the supply of labour increased).216 At Wylam, 
we only have two records of these Monthly Bonds- April 1844 (at its 
introduction) and February 1847. We do not know whether these are the only 
copies to survive, or if they were simply renewed every month.  
 
Colls claims that the Monthly Bond lasted until 1854217, but the first record after 
the Monthly Bond at Wylam is the introduction of a semi-annual bond in April 
1856. The end of the Monthly Bond demonstrates a change in the respective 
power of owners and workers.218 The strength of worker power in the 1850s coal 
industry219 can account for the rise in wages during the early 1850s. Indeed, if we 
were to finish our analysis in 1856, we could conclude that the average wage had 
risen to 426 pence per fortnight, and workers were enjoying an extra £8 annually. 
However, over the gap in our wage data between 1856 and 1860-1861, average 
earnings again fell. Whilst we may not have the wages themselves for this 
period, we do have the Bonds which set out the piece rates of hewers. 
Examination of these sources shows the rates of hewers did not change in most 
seams (see Appendix Two), which indicates that there must have been some 
other driver which determined wage levels. There are two explanations for this; 
either the colliery produced less coal in these years or there were more hewers 
                                                 
216 Church, The History of the British Coal Industry. Volume 3, 1830-1913, 1986, 234. 
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employed- both meaning hewers were more inactive. Graph 4 shows that in our 
sample the number of hewers does increase between 1856 and 1860-1861, and 
1860-1861 and 1861-1862. This suggests there was less work available due to a 
greater availability of labour. Graph 5 shows the average wage of hewers and the 
number of hewers in each year. It demonstrates that from 1847 these two factors 
tended to move in opposite directions; an increase in the number of hewers 
generally corresponded with a decrease in the average wage (and vice versa). 
This further supports the idea that labour supply influenced the average wage. 
This trend also fits with data from the late-1830s, apart from the number of 
hewers in 1837. This is likely a sampling problem. For the period 1843-1846 this 
trend does not appear to be present, but this is exacerbated by the 1843-1844 
entry, which was influenced by strikes. Overall it appears that available labour 
and average wage were certainly related.   
 
Secondly, we must attempt to account for the cyclical fluctuations. This is 
closely linked to the determining factors of wages over the longer term- the 
relationship between workers and their employers. Piece rates again would seem 
to be the obvious cause, as there were minimal changes for some seams in the 
colliery, primarily in 1844, 1847 and 1856 (see Appendix Two). However this 
does not explain these changes in wages- the pattern which they follow is not 
mirrored by the piece rates. Again, this could be a question of colliery output. If 
Wylam produced more coal in some years, then more shifts would have been 
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available. Whilst- as has already been discussed- this was also tied to the amount 
of labour available, the general pattern of output was not as turbulent as that of 
wages (see Appendix Three). This indicates that cyclical fluctuations were not 
the outcome of only one factor- a combination of colliery output, piece rates, and 
available labour all helped to dictate wages. Ultimately all of these factors were 
linked to the relationship between management and labour.   
 
Finally, we consider the divergence in the earnings of hewers. This occurs 
towards the end of our period, but unfortunately due to gaps in our wage series, 
the development of this trend is difficult to identify. Colls claims that by the 
1850s the workforce had been de-skilled.220 Owners could not de-skill those 
workers already engaged in coal mining, but they were not required to enforce 
those same skills as a condition for entry to the trade. In this scenario, an influx 
of new workers from different industries could explain this divergence, with 
older hewers able to rely on their experience and out-earn their novice 
counterparts. However, this does not fit with Colls’ timeline- as graph 3 shows, 
the standard deviation of average earnings spikes upwards in 1860-1861/1861-
1862.  
 
However, an influx of labour may still explain this divergence. The number of 
hewers in our sample certainly increases in the early 1860s. Statistics for the 
output of the coal industry in the Northeast show a sizable jump between 1859 
and 1860221, which could only have occurred if the Northern coalfield was able 
to recruit more workers. Additionally, Church demonstrates that the Northeast 
was indeed drawing in workers from other industries during the 1860s.222 
Examination of the piece rates shows that from April 1856 until April 1862 there 
was no major change in the negotiated rates of hewers. There are limited changes 
in one of the five seams listed but the rate was actually higher in 1861-1862 than 
in 1856. This demonstrates that these new workers were not the result of surplus 
labour, as this would have resulted in a depression of piece rates. Therefore, as 
the workforce expanded, a greater proportion of it was made up of ‘de-skilled’ 
                                                 
220 Colls, The Pitmen of the Northern Coalfield, 102, 113, 114. 
221 B. R. Mitchell, Abstract of British Historical Statistics; (London, etc,: Cambridge UP, 1962), 
115. 
222 Church, The History of the British Coal Industry. Volume 3, 1830-1913, 1986, 234. 
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labour. The coal industry was not able to recruit skilled pitmen; it had to train 
and development them. This meant that those new recruits to the coal industry 
took time to learn the trade and therefore we see a greater dispersion of average 
wages, as experienced workers were able to out-earn the new novice recruits. 
 
Our findings with regard to hewers are therefore that wages at the start and the 
end of our series were of the same absolute level, but there were cyclical 
fluctuations throughout the period, which reached a high point in 1856. We 
conclude that these fluctuations were a consequence of the amount of work 
available, due to a combination of the number of hewers employed by the 
colliery, and the amount of coal which the colliery produced. We also identify 
that the wages of individual hewers became more varied at the end of the period, 
and suggest that this was due to the expansion of output in the Northeast, and the 
recruitment of unskilled labour that this required.  
Putters 
Returning to actual wage levels, putters appear to have followed a similar 
pattern, but with more drastic changes. Their wages still fluctuate, but appear to 
suffer a period of depression in the late 1830s and early 1840s. This was 
followed by a constant increase over the mid-1840s, to a peak in 1856, before 
falling in the early 1860s. Again, overall wages appear to have been stagnant 
over the period- at 379 pence per fortnight in 1836, and 384 pence per fortnight 
in 1860-1861. This appears to be roughly in line with the trend of hewers’ wages. 
The increased magnitude of the changes could be due to the smaller sample size 
of these workers in our data, but more likely demonstrates an increased variance 
in the earnings of putters. There has been rather little quantitative investigation 
into the earnings of putters in the literature, but that they follow the overall trend 




It is interesting to note the relative difference between hewers and putters wages. 
Whilst we shall see that there was a significant step up in earnings from driving 
to putting, the case is less so for putting to hewing. As graph 6 shows, the 
calculated average wage of putters was closely comparable to that of hewers, the 
former even exceeding the latter in a number of years. Whilst this may initially 
seem like an error, there are several reasons for this being the case. Firstly, it is 
important to remember the methodological stand-point of this study. Hewers and 
putters were assigned as such by their primary occupation. As will later be 
demonstrated, many workers also took shifts in other capacities. This means that 
hewers may have also been working as putters at certain periods, and vice versa. 
The extent of this varied, but this study aimed to demonstrate that the ‘average 
hewer’ or the ‘average putter’ would not always have been employed in his 
primary occupation. Secondly, we must recall that these are the actual ‘take 
home’ earnings of these workers. This becomes especially relevant with fines. 
Hewers were harshly fined by viewers and overmen223- their complaints evident 
not least in their strike grievances of 1831, 1832 and 1844224- and we therefore 
may be seeing the impact of such fines. This becomes doubly important as 
putters were not subjected to such deductions for their workmanship.225 
Unfortunately, as has previously been mentioned, it is not possible at present to 
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quantify the fines imposed on hewers. Whilst deductions for benefits such as 
medical care were compulsory (and quantifiable, at 6 pence per fortnight), others 
were optional (fire coal was taken only when required, and also charged at 6 
pence), it is likely that the bulk of the deductions were due to fines. Thirdly, as 
this is a sample of the seams in the colliery as a whole it is possible that extra 
work for hewers has been lost. However this probably occurred in a minimal 
number of cases, and therefore should have little impact on our results. 
 
The result of this is that hewers’ and putters’ wages were on a similar absolute 
level. Whilst putters were to some extent dependent on hewers (if there was no 
coal to transport, they were unable to earn any money), both worked on a system 
of piece rates. Changes to putters’ rates were relatively minor and infrequent- 
rarely amounting to more than 1d per tub. The most significant change was the 
distance which he had to transport coal in order to earn for each tub, and this 
occurred at Wylam in 1838-1839 when it changed from 60 to 80 yards.226 
Additionally, the size of the tub the putter had to transported changed in 1844, 
when it became 20 rather than 16 peck (a unit of measurement where one peck 
equalled around nine litres). Much of the comparability between hewers and 
putters earnings can be explained by cross-occupational shift working. Later in 
this research we report our findings on secondary employment in the mine, but 
we are yet to quantify exactly how much of fortnightly income was typically 
attained in this manner. 
 
This has drastic implications for the family economy. Putters were generally at 
the age where they would still be living at home, and therefore their income 
would still be going to their families as a whole. This means that the household 
may have had the equivalent of two or more adult male incomes, and therefore 
enjoyed a much higher standard of living than previous anticipated. For brief 
periods families may have had three or four of these incomes at the same time. 
Hewers’ wages do not seem particularly high, so in order for Britain to enjoy a 
                                                 
226 A putters’ work involved moving full tubs of coal from the face to the drivers (who would 
then transport it out of the mine). He was paid by the tub. For a description of putters’ work, see; 
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‘high-wage’ economy (as suggested by more general literature227) ‘child’ labour 
would have had to have been a large contributor- which it seems to have been. 
This will be more fully discussed in later sections. 
 
Additionally, the standard deviations of hewers’ and putters’ wages have been 
compared in graph 7. It should be observed that putters generally saw smaller 
deviations in their wages than hewers in the earlier part of the period (until 
1845). From 1845 until 1854 levels of dispersion are remarkably comparable 
between the two occupations. Whilst the values for each of the semi-annual 
Bonds in 1856 for putters are very low in comparison to the rest of the series 
(likely due to the smaller size of the sample during those Bonds), the level of 
putters’ dispersion after 1855 does seem to be lower than that of hewers. Fines 
would have caused more variation in hewers’ wages than in putters’ (as more of 
the finable offenses applied to hewers’ work), and as putters were paid by the 
same rate no matter where they worked in the mine (whereas hewers’ rates 
varied) their earnings would likely have been more uniform. These factors point 
to the comparability of variation in earnings during the middle of the period as an 
oddity. If the distinction between a hewer and putter was looser during this 
period (due to cross-occupational shift working) then this might explain such a 
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trend, but as previously mentioned we are yet to quantify this factor. In any case, 
this further points to the comparability of the earnings of hewers and putters; and 
whilst their typical wages varied by different amounts, the difference between 




The number of entries included for drivers is smaller than those for putters, but 
they do seem to follow a trend. Unlike hewers and trappers, drivers were paid by 
a daily rate, meaning vast fluctuations in their income were less commonplace. 
One added complication is that these daily rates are not always referred to in the 
Bonds, and drivers appear not to have signed a Bond every year. In these years, 
the Bond references “putting with the ponies” which seems an accurate 
description of driving work. It therefore seems that drivers signed the Bond 
under the title of putters in certain years. However, the paybills distinguish 
between drivers and putters throughout, and as occupation has primarily been 
determined from the wage data (with the Bonds used as secondary supporting 
evidence) this has been a relatively minor issue in the present study. 
 
As graph 8 shows, drivers appear to have been making slight gains from the mid 
to late 1830s, to then follow a downwards curve until around 1850. This then has 
an upwards trajectory until around 1855, when it again sees a downturn before 
the break in our series. It re-joins at roughly the same level in 1860-1861, and 
remains there for the following year. This is essentially the same pattern as other 
workers discussed, but with a much smoother curve due to being paid by a daily 




These are all very small changes in comparison to other occupations which saw 
far more drastic trends. The relatively stagnant wages of drivers suggests that 
they were paid comparatively little attention in comparison to other occupations 
in the mine- both by the management and the workers themselves. Whilst the 
wage disputes of hewers (and to a more limited extent, putters) were on the 
forefront of industrial relations, the younger workers in the mine were considered 
less important; the sporadic nature of drivers being included as a separate 
category in the Bond testifies to this. This is likely because in comparison to 
putters and hewers they earned very little, and therefore were not a target of cost 
cutting measures which often prompted industrial disputes. As we shall see in the 
next section, trappers and switch-workers did see greater movement in their 
wages, but it is suggested this is more as a result of changes in working hours 








Trappers (and working the switches) 
The final category of worker this study investigated was trappers. Here we 
included those working the switches, as they were roughly of equitable status in 
the mine, received roughly equal pay, and boys often performed both roles. As 
shown in graph 9 average wages of this group were very dispersed before 1840, 
showing no discernible trend. But from 1843 they do show a remarkably grouped 
increase until 1855, when the majority of these entries end. Just as remarkable is 
the change in wage level before and after 1843. Whilst there is a sustained 
increase after this year, this begins from an absolute lower level. We therefore 
seek to explain not only what caused this increase, but also what caused trappers’ 
wages to drop in the early-1840s. 
 
There are relatively few entries for these occupations in our data, due to the 
limited number of boys required to fulfil these roles in the daily working of the 
mine. However such a strong trend after 1843 suggests that there may well have 
been wage increases. This was not the consequence of a change in the daily rate, 
as Appendix Two shows that these were constant for the majority of the period.  
The driving force behind this was those primarily working the switches rather 
than trapping, although both saw wage increases over the period of discussion. 
This may have been a consequence of the 1842 Employment Commission and 
the subsequently imposed limits on the hours of boys in the mine. By imposing 
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an age restriction of ten228, the Mines and Collieries Act of 1842 ensured that 
those who had previously been used to trap were now banned from the mine. 
Older boys may therefore have been expected to attend work more regularly, 
rather than more unreliable younger ones who were not capable of working a full 
working week. Additionally, they were more likely to also work in other 
occupations which were more lucrative. There is a marked increase after 1842 in 
these boys also participating in driving work, among other tasks, which would 
allow them to supplement their income. These opportunities would not have been 
available to the very youngest workers who were employed in these roles prior to 
1842. Whilst this explains why wages were able to gradually increase, with those 
in trapping and switch-working increasingly participating in other occupations, it 
does not explain the drop in wage levels around 1842. The potential reasons for 
this are discussed below. 
 
The explanation for the drop in wage levels before this sustained rise is likely 
related to the changes brought about by the 1842 legislation, but the causality is 
less clear. We know that this is not a consequence of falling daily rates, as the 
Bonds do not show them dropping in the early-1840s (as shown in Appendix 
Two). This must therefore be related to the amount or type of work available. 
Our sample does not show an increase in the number of trappers and switch-
workers employed, so it seems unlikely that there were more boys employed 
prohibiting the number of work-days available to each. The colliery being 
inactive might explain a drop for one year, but not why the general pattern and 
level of wages would fail to rebound afterwards. All of our entries before 1842 
are trappers rather than switchmen, so this may be related to the amount of 
trapping work available in the mine changing in 1842. However, at present it is 
not clear what caused this change, or if this was the consequence of some other 
factor which has not yet been identified. Additionally, this trend may be 
overstated, as the highly paid but highly dispersed nature of wages before 1842 
seems to be a consequence of two trappers who worked in this occupation for 
three continuous years. Without these entries, there would be a far smaller 
decrease, which could be explained by the loss of two working days per fortnight 
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for each worker. Again, the factors surrounding this loss of work are unclear, but 
it is far easier to explain than the large decrease with no other apparent drastic 
change. 
 
In sum, the present study comes to several conclusions about the general pattern 
of wages over the period of 1836 to 1862. The occupation with the greatest 
number of entries is hewing, and therefore presents the most reliable results. 
Here we find that wages were stagnant for most of the period, presenting 
evidence that the first (1836-1837) and last (1861-1862) points were only 5 
pence per fortnight apart. However, these wages were not static, undergoing 
yearly fluctuations so that the difference between the highest peak and the lowest 
trough was 174 pence per fortnight. We also identify a greater divergence of 
earnings between hewers later in the period, but demonstrate that fortunes 
differed for individual hewers throughout the period.  
 
Whilst the average trend of wages can give us a clue to how the standard-of-
living progressed through this period, we see it as simply a piece of the picture 
which earnings describe, and that the deviations and fluctuations are just as 
important. We believe the static level of wages over our wage series as a whole 
to be a consequence of labour relations (and the onset of the Monthly Bond), 
with the colliery’s owners actively depressing wages in an attempt to maximise 
profits by reducing working costs. We also believe that there was an increased 
amount of labour available by the beginning of the 1860s, but that this did not 
cause a depression of wages, due to the industry’s simultaneously increased 
output- however, it did cause wages to become more dispersed, and further 
contribute to differences in the experiences of mining families. In relation to the 
annual fluctuations of wages, our analysis suggests that this was not simply a 
result of piece rates, but would also have been determined by demand for coal in 
each year.  
 
We have also evaluated the trends in the wages of putters, drivers and trappers. 
We believe that the number of entries for putters makes our wage series 
representative (of Wylam Colliery at least), although we acknowledge our series 
for drivers and trappers do contain a less than ideal number of entries. However, 
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we maintain that the trends of these series do have explanatory power, despite 
these limitations. We find that putters earned wages on a comparable level to 
hewers, which had been asserted but not previously examined in the literature. 
We suggest that this was due to the fines imposed on hewers and the cross-
occupational employment of many workers in the mine. This has significant 
implications for the family economy. We also found those earnings to be roughly 
in line with the wage trends of hewers.  
 
The story for drivers seems similar, their wages stagnant throughout the period- 
thanks to their relatively little importance in industrial relations. However, 
trappers and switch-workers saw increases after 1842 (after a fall from earlier 
levels, for which the reasons are unclear), which seems likely to be a 
consequence of the Mines and Collieries Act of the same year.  
Comparisons to Existing Wage Estimates 
For estimates which compare directly to our own wage series, Church is the most 
widely used source. Whilst he later deflates them to produce a real wage series, 
his nominal wage estimates are also compared to the present study at both a 
national and regional level. As Church does not list these wage rates explicitly, a 
deconstruction of his index is required. For both series, Church lists an index of 
hewers’ wages as a function of a base price.229 Using his index numbers, the 
actual wages (which Church has calculated per shift) are established. These are 
then multiplied by the number of days Church lists for each year that a hewer 
worked in a week230 and doubled to yield a fortnightly one. 
 
                                                 
229 Church, The History of the British Coal Industry. Volume 3, 1830-1913, 1986, 561, 641–645. 
230 Ibid., 248. 
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As the present study uses Bond years for its wage estimates and Church used 
calendar years, comparison is not completely exact, but the first year of the Bond 
was selected from the present study for comparison (as the majority of the Bond 
was valid in that year). The comparison is illustrated by graph 10 and graph 11. 
The first thing to note is that in a regional comparison the estimates of the 
present study are consistently lower than those of Church’s series. Only at three 
points (1843, 1848 and 1853) do the two series appear to agree on the same level 
of wages. In the mid to late 1830s the two series take opposite directions, before 
both taking a downwards trajectory from 1839. Although a gap in the present 
series then follows, both seem to agree on a low point in 1843. They then take 
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different trajectories before meeting again at 1848. From there, the present study 
sees a downwards trend in wages until 1852, whereas Church’s series sees a 
slight increase so that its level is almost the same as it was at 1848. Church’s 
series then sees a far greater jump in wages, but this occurs a year later (1853) 
than the present study (1852). Church’s estimate then sees a static wage rate in 
the early 1860s, whereas the present study sees a decline. 
 
The national estimates show a related, yet different picture. They are far more 
comparable on an absolute level, whilst demonstrating roughly the same shape as 
Church’s estimates for the Northeast. There is a more considerable drop in 1842, 
which the Northeast appears not to have suffered, and a larger spike in 1837, but 
overall the trend is comparable to both other series.  
 
That the general shape of both the present series, and that calculated by Church 
for the Northeast are similar reinforces their validity, as they have been compiled 
from different sources. However, the lower relative level of the present series 
could have drastic affects for the standard-of-living of miners. The evidence that 
Church used to construct his estimates can help to explain why they differ. 
Church uses a variety of sources; his series for the Northeast appears to be based 
on the Children’s Employment Commission of 1842 and other official reports 
from later in the period. He also uses records from nineteenth century observers 
and unpublished PhD theses.231 These are included, along with other regional 
studies and comparable reports to those used for the Northeast, in his national 
series.232 Official reports are very different documents to actual pay bills. They 
may record the expected wage rate, or the supposed wage rate, but working from 
the records of the wages that workers actually received seems superior in source 
material in this regard. Of course, it is possible that Wylam was simply less well 
paid than other collieries in the period. Kirby’s comparisons to the coalfield as a 
whole suggest that it was a little smaller than average233, but it seems unlikely 
that this would have meant significantly lower wage levels. There are other 
reasons for which Wylam might have had lower wage rates. It may have been 
                                                 
231 Ibid., 645. 
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233 Kirby, “Attendance and Work Effort in the Great Northern Coalfield, 1775–1864,” 966. 
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able to attract workers through other benefits- for example better housing, 
preferable working conditions or added incentives- but there are no indications 
that this was the case. It may have been able to negotiate workers down, but with 
a relatively integrated labour market this seems unlikely. We therefore show that 
there is a real difference between Church’s estimates and the actual pay level of 
hewers during this period.                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
As has been established, the present estimates report a much lower level of pay 
than Church’s did. Colls refers to Church’s estimates as providing a picture of 
“quite desperate levels of poverty in the 1830s and 1840s”234 and that hewers’ 
earnings were “consistently below cost of living subsistence levels”235. This 
obviously causes a problem, as our lower estimates would put hewers even 
further below the subsistence level. The solution to this problem lies in the 
family economy. It may well be that hewers’ wages were well below subsistence, 
but the labour of the rest of the family allowed it to buy the necessary items to 
survive, and even generate a limited amount of surplus income. As we have 
already seen, a putter’s wage could equal that of a hewer, and even the addition 
of a driver would significantly raise income above the level of earnings which 
Church advocates for hewers alone. 
 
Church also calculated a cost of living index from 1830. Taking 1900 as a base 
year, the cost of living for 1836 to 1861 (the time span relevant to our wage data) 
was highest in the late 1830s and early 1840s, seeing a spike in the mid-1840s 
before dropping down almost as low as 1900 in the early 1850s. It then 
proceeded to rise again from the mid-1850s.236 He describes the 1850s and 1860s 
as a “transition […] towards less severe short-run fluctuations in living costs 
beginning in mid-Victorian Britain”237. We can apply this to our present study in 
order to produce our own real wage series. For 1830 to 1850, Church uses the 
Gayer, Rostow and Schwarz index (GRS), although he does highlight its 
shortcomings, which are explained below. After 1850, he opts for G. H. Wood’s 
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series.238 Rebasing Church’s index to 1850 and applying it to our wages yielded 
the real wages series in graph 12. This clearly shows an upwards trend of real 
wages from the mid-1830s until the mid-1850s, then with a drop off in the early 
1860s. In a comparison of the index of wages against the cost-of-living index (as 
shown in graph 13) we see that the series move broadly in step, but with a much 
lower starting point (after the first gap in our wage data) in 1843-1844, and far 
greater acceleration of wages- beginning  in 1852 and continuing until a sudden 
drop in 1856. As these series track each other so closely, this does not change our 
interpretation of wage trends dramatically, although the acceleration in the early 
1850s does mean that living standards jumped more noticeably after 1852. The 
decrease in wages in the late 1840s/early 1850s also disappears due to an almost 
equal decrease in cost-of-living. 
                                                 




The GRS index consists of twenty-six domestic and fifty imported 
commodities.239 Taylor describes it as “a highly sophisticated compilation based 
upon much detailed and well-shifted information, and carefully weighted”240, 
however he also highlights that it “contains many substantial elements far 
removed from any household budget”241. Additionally, it does not account for 
“varying distribution and middlemen’s costs”242. Wood’s series is constructed 
mainly from the Board of Trade’s “Report on Wholesale and Retail prices”243, 
however it also contains data from “personal inquiries”244, other “short series and 
isolated statements”245 and one other published source (for Staffordshire 
prices)246. Wood describes the result as “frankly experimental”247. However, 
Church describes it as “the most reliable available indicator of living costs in the 
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nineteenth century”248 due to the wide spread of regional evidence, the number of 
contemporary sources249 and the checks that Wood conducted against “actual 
consumption and expenditure”250. Church opts to use the GRS as he argues the 
“distortion likely to result from splicing the GRS with the Wood index would be 
less than […] the alternatives.”251 An issue with using Church’s series is that 
when selecting his data for after 1850, he opts for Wood’s index which includes 
an estimate for rent.252 Rent was controlled in our data, and therefore this is 
unnecessary. When using Wood’s commodity series without his estimate for 
rents, minimal changes are observed, but nothing significant enough to alter our 
view of the overall trends. We therefore conclude that real wages improved from 
the beginning of our series until the mid-1850s, before falling in the early 1860s. 
 
As a point of comparison, Gregory Clark’s recent index has been used. This 
index uses 36 items “including such exotica as stockings, gloves, and 
trenchers”253, which “were amalgamated into 12 subcategories: grains and 
potato, dairy, meats, sugars, drink, salt, fuel, light, soap, clothing, lodging, and 
services”254. Clark recently used this index to produce real wages for his farm 
labourers between 1209 and 1869.  
 
Using a similar procedure as was used with the GRS/Wood index, we have 
rebased this index to the year of 1850. It has then been used with the nominal 
wage series of the present study. The results of this are presented in comparison 
to Church’s index in graph 14. As will be evident, there are some minimal 
changes in the real wages of our coal miners, but the overall trend remains the 
same.  
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One thing that becomes immediately clear is that the real wages of miners in the 
mid-to-late 1830s are higher using Clark’s index than Church’s. This is due to 
the basket-of-goods selected for comparison. But following the first gap in our 
wage data, the series are mostly similar. Clark’s index gives a smoother curve 
(and slightly higher level) for real wages during the mid-to-late 1840s, but the 
early 1850s are almost identical. Clark’s index then gives a slightly higher level 
in the mid-1850s, and increases between 1853 and 1855 (whilst Church’s 
declines), but these differences are minimal. Both series show the jump between 
different Bonds in 1856, with the change to semi-annual bonding from the years 
of the Monthly Bond. After the second gap in our wage data, both indices give 
very similar values for the early-1860s. 
 
The key talking point here is clearly the early part of the series; in particular 
before the first gap in our wage data. Both show the same shape in the mid-to-
late 1830s, but Clark’s index estimates this relatively higher than Church’s. 
However, when considering this period in relation to the rest of the respective 
series, this does not change the picture dramatically- both series still calculate a 
gradual increase in real wages over the period, from 1836 until 1856. The main 
difference is that in Church’s series, the 1843-1844 point appears as a 
continuation of the level in the 1830s, whereas Clark’s shows it as an actual 




This affects our understanding of the earnings of miners in the 1830s, relative to 
the rest of the period. Certainly, there were still gains, but these were far more 
minimal with Clark’s index, and similar to the level of the 1860s (even after an 
influx of unskilled labour). However, it should be recalled that the relative 
dispersion of wages in 1860s was far greater than in the 1830s, so the effect of 
this difference in skill levels would still have been a factor in earnings. 
 
Overall, whilst these indices give slightly different pictures of real wages over 
the period, they both endorse the overall trend of real wages rising from the 
1836-1837 until 1856, and then returning to a lower level in the early-1860s. The 
relative level of the 1830s is an important issue, but it does not alter the overall 
trend. These real wages help us understand changes in the standard-of-living of 
these mining families over the period, despite not making up the whole picture, 
as has already been discussed. But they do show very tangible changes in the 
income of mining families over the period, which would certainly have affected 
their purchasing power, and therefore living standards. In material standards, a 
mining family would almost certainly have been better off in the mid-1850s than 
any other point in our wage series. 
 
Additionally, Flinn records some estimates for other occupations. He claims that 
in 1831, trappers were paid 10d per day, drivers 14d per day, and putters earned 
somewhere between this and a full hewers wages.255 Flinn does not take this idea 
of putters having wages equitable to hewers any further, as we have done in the 
present study, presumably due to lack of evidence. Church calculates the 
percentage of an adult’s wage which “juvenile”256 workers earned, but claims 
that from 1842 to 1886, those aged fourteen to eighteen years earned “between 
45 and 60 per cent of an adult hewer’s wage.”257 This has already been shown to 
be inaccurate in reference to the present study with the wage levels of putters.  
 
In conclusion, we have compared the estimates for our calculated wage series to 
those already existing in the literature. We find when comparing our estimates to 
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Church’s (who has the most overlap with the present study) that his data for the 
Northeast show a similar trend, but that our absolute levels are lower. We have 
discussed the implications of this for standard-of-living.  
 
We have also reused Church’s cost-of-living index with our own data. After 
adjusting the base year to 1850, we find that standard-of-living appears to have 
increased gradually over the period, until it begins to fall off again in the late 
1850s/early 1860s. The cost-of-living appears to very closely match the 
movement in wages, causing this increase. This does not differ significantly from 
the pattern of nominal wages observed in this period. As a comparison, we have 
also used Clark’s recent index with our data. Whilst this yielded a slightly 
different relative level of the late-1830s, compared to the rest of the series, again 
the shape of our wages remained broadly the same. 
Deviation in Wages 
Whilst the general pattern of wages certainly aids our understanding of the 
fortunes of mine workers in this period, perhaps just as important are the relative 
fortunes of different individuals in the mines. It would be easy to assume that all 
miners earned the same wage rate in each year, and that the only movement was 
on a year-on-year basis; but this was certainly not the case. This further 
demonstrates the potential problems with using wages as a proxy for standard-of-
living. However, to examine each individual case separately is impractical, and 
therefore a certain level of generalisation is required. However, it still remains 
important to consider the extent to which the fortunes of workers differed. The 
current section will concentrate on hewers, in order to provide robust 
comparisons. Hewers wages began to see further deviation towards the end of 
our series, and the reasons why this might have been the case have already been 
discussed. This section considers the distribution of wages throughout the period, 
and its impact on standards-of-living. 
 
Let us return to graph 3, which we have previously examined to find that the 
standard deviation of average earnings is higher at the end of the period, in 
particular 1861-1862. It starts off high in 1836-1837, and rapidly falls until 1838-
1839, where it gradually rises until 1840-1841 and the first gap in our series. We 
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re-join in 1843-1844, at the lowest level for the whole of our series. It then 
rapidly climbs and falls, but maintains an overall upwards trajectory, before 
gradually climbing from 1853 to 1856. The second Bond period of 1856 then 
sees a rapid spike. This is still at roughly the same level when we re-join our 
series in 1860-1861, peaking in 1861-1862. 
 
What did this mean for our workers and their standard-of-living? Here, we must 
consider not only the trends of this deviation, but also the absolute values. The 
smallest standard deviation of an average wage was 54 pence per fortnight in 
1843-1844. The average wage for this year was 295 pence per fortnight, meaning 
the upper bound for this year was 349 pence and the lower bound 241 pence. 
Albeit this was the low point for average wages overall, these are very different 
fortunes on each end of the scale in the least varied year. The maximum standard 
deviation was 163 in 1861-1862- with an average wage of 346 pence per 
fortnight, this means the upper and lower bounds were 183 and 509 pence. Such 
different fortunes mean that the trends which describe average wages do not 
apply to all workers. Therefore, an increase in average wages did not necessarily 
mean that standard-of-living improved, as increases in deviation could mean that 
not all workers would have shared in these gains.  
 
We have also compared the standard deviation by calculating it as a percentage 
of the average annual earnings in that year, shown in graph 15. This presents 
slightly different results. Relatively, the value for 1837-1838 is much closer to 
75 
 
that of 1836-1837, which means there is a much larger drop from 1837-1838 to 
1838-1839. There is also a slight drop, rather than rise the year after. The level at 
which we re-join the series after the first gap in our data appears much closer, 
and 1852 to 1855 are much lower relative to the rest of the series. The spike 
around 1856 also occurs sooner, but fails to reach the level of 1860-1861, as it 
had done in the absolute series. We do not claim that either method is better than 
the other, but simply that there are two different ways to represent the data. The 
lowest percentage of the average wage in our data was 17 percent, the highest 
being 47 percent. These corresponded to the absolute lowest and highest years. 
The general shape of the series, apart from the differences already highlighted, 
remains largely unchanged. We still see a drop in the early years of our wage 
series, a period of rapid ups and downs from the mid-1840s until the early 1850s, 
a plateau in the early to mid-1850s, followed by a rise, and finally a large rise in 
the early 1860s. 
 
Whilst the general shape of the series may be similar, this method certainly aids 
comparison of these deviations in different years. For the majority of years, the 
standard deviation was between twenty and thirty percent of the average wage. 
This means that some families would have been up to thirty percent below our 
already revised wage estimates (conversely, some families would have been 
thirty percent higher). This is a significant proportion, and would certainly have 
restricted the already limited disposable income. It would have reinforced their 
need for children to enter employment at a young age, and likely kept them 
(boys, at least) in the mines- a reciprocating cycle.258 The opposite would have 
occurred for families earning higher than the average wage, but the general low 
level of wages make it doubtful that they would be able to break the cycle of 
child labour.  
 
To recap, the standard deviation of average earnings sees a spike in 1854, and 
again in 1861-1862. However, even in ‘normal’ periods (away from the spikes) 
the standard deviation of hewers’ wages falls somewhere between 85 and 100 
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pence per fortnight. We earlier calculated that the average wage per fortnight 
between 1836-1837 and 1856 increased by around £8 per year. The standard 
deviation of hewers’ wages could translate into a difference in wages of over £17 
per year. This suggests that whilst the average wage does represent the changes 
in income of hewers, it fails to account for in many ways a more significant 
factor- the dispersion of wages around this mean. This demonstrates the extent to 
which the average wage may misrepresent the fortunes of all workers, and that 
the degree of deviation from this mean could have a tangible effect on standard-
of-living. 
 
Fluctuations in Wages  
So far, we have considered general wage levels, and their deviation. We have 
also looked at the cyclical nature of wages on a year-on-year basis. At this point, 
we also consider fluctuations in wages on a fortnightly basis, and suggest the 
impact that this may have had on standards-of-living. We have therefore 
calculated the standard deviation of the wages in each Bond year for each 
worker. In order to preserve the uncertain nature of a miner’s’ income, fortnights 
where a worker is recorded as having been paid zero earnings have been 
included. We have already seen the standard deviation of hewers’ wages from 
the mean, but we now examine this phenomenon on an individual level.  
 
On this basis, the selection of any worker in our data would demonstrate 
fluctuating wage levels. This was far more apparent in workers paid by piece 
rates than by daily rates- although the latter did see more limited fluctuations due 
to varied working hours. The following examples have been selected to 
demonstrate that fluctuations varied in magnitude, but that workers could rarely 
predict how much they would earn on a fortnightly basis. This would have 
impacted on their spending and standards-of-living. A run of well-paid fortnights 
must always have been soured with the knowledge that such prosperity was not 
to last. It may also have led families to stockpile resources. A good example of 
this is the ‘fire coal’- cheaply available to colliery workers. Whilst some opted to 
buy this coal every week, others bought it sporadically- as demonstrated through 
our employment histories. Obviously this was influenced by consumption, but 
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families may well have been stockpiling when they were able to afford the extra 
expense. There is no reason to believe this could not have occurred for other 
longer-lasting items. 
 
Hewers and putters saw the most varied wages by fortnight. There are many 
examples. John Kenady (hewer, 1845) earned nothing in one fortnight 
(presumably due to injury or illness), but as high as 408.5 in another. His average 
wage was 280, and the standard deviation 134. Thomas Armstrong (hewer, 1846) 
earned as low as 207 pence and peaked at 528.5 in a fortnight. His average 
fortnightly wage as 409 pence and the standard deviation of his wage for that 
year was 84 pence. Edward Thompson (hewer, 1861-1862) earned as much as 
439.5 pence, as little as 94.5, averaged 293, and had a standard deviation of 103. 
John Graham (putter, 1850) earned between 63 and 462 pence, with an average 
of 287 and a standard deviation of 108. The large standard deviations in some of 
our examples- and plenty more in our data- were not always a result of different 
work efforts, although this was a factor. Incapacitation and illness259 explain 
some of the very low figures, but this speaks to the uncertain nature of coal 
mining- and the high risk of these factors needs to be included in the variation of 
wages. Additionally, seasonality would have played a role- in the months before 
high demand periods the mines might operate almost continuously, whereas in 
the summer months they may have been more inactive.260 This would have 
impacted the ability of miners to work, and therefore altered their wage levels. 
Future investigations will quantify the extent of seasonality in miners’ wages, but 
as this is a large undertaking, time and space constraints have not allowed for this 
in the present study. 
 
If we take an example of a driver, we still see fluctuations in pay. Thomas 
Appleby has a very complete record for 1850. He moves between seams over the 
year, but common practises indicate it would be more surprising if he did not. 
The standard deviation of his wages was 18 pence, with an average fortnightly 
earning of 119. His largest earnings in a fortnight were 154 pence, and his lowest 
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84. Due to his relatively small absolute earnings, the standard deviation actually 
made up a sizable proportion- around 15 percent of his average wage. In our 
1850 example, the average wage of a male hewer was 323 pence per fortnight. In 
a family containing only a hewer and driver (which would have occurred when 
only one son was old enough to work) then the drivers’ wages would make up 
roughly one quarter of the families’ income. Fluctuations in this wage could have 
a very real effect on the surplus income of that family, as it would likely have a 
large number of dependents at that stage (family’s tended to have children 
relatively close together, and therefore if the eldest child was young enough to be 
working as a driver, there would likely have been younger children not yet in 
employment), and therefore be under financial pressure.261 
 
We then take the individual standard deviations of hewers wages, and calculated 
how deviated they themselves are from their mean (graph 16). This allows 
examination on a larger scale of individual fluctuations in workers’ wages. We 
find that this spikes upwards in 1854, and then again in 1860-1861/1861-1862. It 
is lowest in 1851, where there is a small downwards spike. There are also smaller 
upwards spikes in 1838 and 1847. Overall, there is a downwards trend for the 
first half of our period, although there appears to be a slight rise in the gap 
between 1841 and 1843. Between the 1847 and 1851 spikes there is a slight 
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upwards trend. But the differences become more noticeable after 1850. There is a 
rapid increase until 1854, and an equally rapid decrease until 1856, before 
shooting up again in the second Bond period of 1856. After our second gap, it 
reaches its peak in 1861-1862. 
 
We must ask therefore how this affected standard-of-living and our workers’ 
lives. Whilst hewers could subscribe to friendly societies which would 
compensate them in the case of illness and injury, and the Bond provided limited 
sick pay, this was certainly short of a fortnight’s wages. Additionally, the mine 
being inactive for several days a week reduced wages. Church has compiled 
evidence which shows miners worked on average four to four-and-half days per 
week during the period of our wage series.262 He claims that on a national level 
this was mainly a response to “depressed trade and lowered prices”.263 This 
would have affected the entire family in a way which illness to one worker would 
not, and caused serious problems for a family reliant upon mining. 
 
A lack of steady income had several implications. Firstly, whilst we are able to 
calculate an average wage for the entire year, those working at the time did not 
have such a luxury. The variability of fortnightly rates meant they could not be 
sure of what they would earn for the rest of the year, and this meant it was 
difficult to commit to spending over a yearly period. It could also have led to the 
stockpiling of durable resources, as has already been discussed. It likely, as per 
the Basu luxury axiom264, also encouraged child labour, as families were keen to 
maximise their income in case of times of austerity.  
 
This section has evaluated fluctuations in the fortnightly wages of individual 
workers. It has identified that this was the norm for all those in the mining 
industry- even those paid by a daily rate. It has also discussed the potential 
impact of this on the standard-of-living of these miners, concluding that an 
unsteady income stream probably had detrimental effects on the family economy 
and encouraged child labour. Additionally, factors such as the mine being idle 
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compounded problems for the family, as unlike illness it impacted upon the 
ability of all family members to work.  
 
The Spread of Occupations and Progression in the Mine 
We should note that each year, hewers tend to make up 60 to 75 percent of 
persons considered. This was not intentional, and our sampling method therefore 
allows us to consider this a rough occupational distribution of underground 
workers. This makes sense logically- supporting roles were required, but the 
most man-power was needed at the coal face itself. This does beg the question 
how those in supporting occupations progress through the mine, ultimately 
becoming hewers in their own right. Firstly, it should be established that not all 
young boys did. Some died or were crippled265, others were recruited to other 
industries (although this was relatively few).266 However, hewing was always the 
goal.  
 
Those who were promoted from putting to hewing were identified for each year 
(see the section on Migration for an explanation of data and methodologies). On 
average 1.7 putters were promoted to hewers per Bond year, with no more than 
four any year. The progression within the same mine, therefore, appears to be 
somewhat limited. Putters would typically spend seven or eight years in that role, 
building up their physical strength, although age was an important factor in their 
promotion.267  
 
A similar investigation was carried out for the progression of drivers to putters, 
but the small sample size resulted in very mixed results. Drivers are not 
identified as such in the Bonds during some years, but the task of “putting with 
the ponies” is specified. This suggests they may have signed as putters, or not at 
all. Church uses evidence from the 1842 Employment Commission to suggest the 
latter was the case268, but the present study finds evidence which contradicts this. 
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Signatories of the Bond signed under the heading of ‘driver’ in many years. For 
those years which a separate ‘driver’ category fails to appear, it is likely they 
signed as putters, but were employed as drivers (in other words “putting with the 
ponies”). 
 
Men also frequently took shifts in other capacities. This was not only in filling in 
for what were presumably unexpected absences, but also ‘ad hoc’ jobs which 
could be quite valuable to an individual or gang. When assessing our data, it 
quickly becomes apparent this occurred with regularity. As the present study 
focuses on those in hewing, putting, driving and trapping, it obviously will see 
more of those men and boys taking part in other occupations. However the 
paybills also identify shift workers taking work in those occupations.  
 
In a year, an average 39 percent of hewers also took at least one shift in another 
occupation. This ranged from 22 percent (1846) to 74 percent (1839-1840). 
There appears to be no long-running trend, but most years are between 30 and 50 
percent. For putters, this was far higher. The average over all years was 89 
percent, with eight years seeing 100 percent of putters also working in another 
occupation. Again, there appears to be no trend over time, but as only two years 
saw values of less than 80 percent, it seems putters rarely worked only in a 
putting capacity. Overall, this means that 50 percent of our workers took shifts in 
other occupations over the year.  
 
How might this impact on our understanding of progression through 
occupations? We already know promotion depended upon the age of the worker, 
and his experience. ‘Age’ may well have been a guide for ‘strength’ in this 
scenario. We now present an explanation of how this experience was obtained 
without a formal apprenticing system, as was present in other mining regions.269 
Whilst younger workers must have initially been shown how to perform tasks, a 
far more efficient way for them to hone their skills was practise ‘on the job’. This 
also explains why this practise was less common for hewers- already being at the 
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top of the tree, they didn’t require the experience and had to be forced to take 
other work. For putters, drivers and trappers, it was vital for their progression. 
 
The Bond itself specified that hewers must receive a particular daily rate in order 
to work in an occupation other than hewing. However the literature, by 
highlighting the demands of striking hewers that they were not be used in other 
occupations,270 implies that it was the discretion of the overman271 which 
determined in which occupation a man worked. However, despite the reluctance 
of mine workers to do so, it appears that experience in other occupations was 
certainly not uncommon. Whilst it is understandable that hewers did not wish to 
be forced to work in a capacity they considered below their station, the reverse 
seems to have been met with little opposition- it being in accordance with the 
aims of the individual to obtain more prestigious employment. Additionally, we 
need not assume that just because the Bond forced workers to comply with the 
viewer’s272 demands meant all workers resisted it. The Bonds terms were mainly 
focussed on hewers, meaning that the clauses may not demonstrate the attitudes 
of workers in other occupations. We should also consider the interest of hewers 
in their families progressing through the mines. They had an economic (and 
social) interest in seeing family members gain experience in other occupations. A 
man might prefer for his driver son to ‘step up’ to cover a putting shift than he 
himself to ‘step down’ from hewing not only for the added wages it brought his 
family, but also because it established his son in a better position to do the same 
task again in the future.  
 
To summarise, our data contain a large number of hewers in proportion to other 
workers, but this does not necessarily make it unrepresentative of the 
employment structure in the mine. We have established that a large number of 
underground workers took shifts in other occupations, and suggested that this 
was the case in order to progress through the occupation hierarchy in the mine. 
We have acknowledged the resistance of hewers to this practise, and highlighted 
that as they had reached the top of this hierarchy they had nothing to gain from 
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the activity. Indeed, we have argued that they stood to gain more from their 
younger family members fulfilling these tasks. Finally, we have acknowledged 
the general stance of the literature that viewers and overmen were the driving 
force behind this practise, but have incorporated this into our own argument and 
highlighted the merits of our alternative interpretation. 
Migration 
As previously mentioned, there appear to be two conflicting arguments in the 
literature related to migration. The first is that workers gained a set of skills 
specifically tailored to the district in which they learnt their trade. Church even 
suggested that this went as far as individual collieries.273 We might therefore 
assume that a miner was at an advantage if he stayed at the same colliery for an 
extended period. In the same chapter, it is suggested by Church (and others such 
as Hair), that the labour market in the northern coalfield was highly mobile, with 
workers moving around frequently in search of better terms of employment.274 
Church argues that the “system of annual hiring may have encouraged these 
migrations once a year”275 and that after 1850 “the decline of annual hiring […] 
had the effect of reducing the incentives for perpetual motion.”276 Whilst Church 
also claims that the decline of “small, rapidly exhausted pits”277 contributed to 
the decline in movement after 1850, he ties migration directly to the system of 
hiring. Overall, there seem to be conflicting ideas that miners gained an 
advantage by remaining at the same colliery, yet they were highly mobile. 
 
We look to address this contradiction, and the relatively little quantitative 
evidence on this topic. By examining those included in our data for each Bond 
year, we are able to draw some conclusions about the mobility of the labour force 
at Wylam. In this scenario if a hewer moved away from the colliery for a period 
of time, he would then be classified as a new worker on any return, as even 
temporary absences signify mobility. As these estimates make no attempt to 
account for the size of the labour force in the northern coalfield, this does not 
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cause any further methodological problems such as double counting. Those 
retained in the colliery were either hewers the year before, or putters who were 
then promoted. As graph 17 shows, apart from one year (1837-1838) Wylam 
retained more workers than it lost. The 1837-1838 exception appears to have 
been caused by lack of data- there are relatively few entries for 1836, meaning 
more workers were likely to be identified as ‘new’ to the colliery. For all 
subsequent years, the number of new workers did not rise above 40 percent of 
those employed.  
 
This seems to reinforce Hair’s calculations, which based on parish records, 
produced a 10 to 35 percent movement.278 Church asserts that the peak of this 
movement was the first half on the nineteenth century, but pays particular 
attention to the 1830s and 1840s.279 The average number of new workers in 
1838-1840 was 33 percent, where in the latter period of 1844 to 1856 this was 21 
percent, potentially supporting this conclusion. If we break down the latter 
period, we do see a drop, from 27 percent 1844-1849, to 17 percent 1850-1856. 
This suggests that even relative to the middle and late 1840s, the 1850s saw far 
less movement- adding further weight to Church’s argument. Whilst the earlier 
period of 1844-1849 does coincide with the Monthly Bond, it should be 
remembered that the latter is also largely under that Bond as well- ending in 
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1854.280 The Bonds at Wylam do not restart in 1854 (instead reappearing in 
1856), but using the period 1844 to 1854 average annual movement under the 
Monthly Bond was 22 percent. The three Bonds in the two years following (due 
to semi-annual bonding) then average 16 percent- after a spike in 1855 seeing the 
two lowest movement rates in our data, 9 and 12 percent. This would suggest that 
the hiring system may have had a role to play in controlling migration, but as 
even during semi-annual bonding migration was low, this cannot have been the 
only factor. Whilst there is only one entry for the 1860s (1861-1862), this was 35 
percent- one that had not been matched since 1848. With this in mind, we now 
attempt to explain these trends. 
 
The first period of our data (1837-1841), ignoring the likely anomalous 1837-
1838 entry, shows a decline in labour of both retained and new alike. The 
colliery also bound its joint-highest number of hewers who had been putters in 
the previous year in 1839-1840, suggesting a need for labour- although these 
numbers remain small throughout the present study. Colliery records show that 
output dropped dramatically between 1837 and 1840, going from one of its 
highest points to the lowest recorded year for the entirety of our period (see 
Appendix Three). We therefore suggest that Wylam likely became a less 
attractive prospect for labour, as it was seeing a decline in its operations over this 
period. Wylam’s decline in production would likely have driven hewers away 
from the colliery, therefore giving opportunities to those such as putters looking 
to move up in the workforce hierarchy. Average wages actually climbed from 
1837-1838 until 1839-1840, although piece rates did drop in one seam going into 
the final Bond year, which also may have dissuaded some workers from signing 
at Wylam (see Appendix Two). These average wage increases may well have 
been a consequence of increasing amounts of work available to those who did 
remain at the colliery.  
 
For 1844-1856 the overall trend of new workers joining Wylam colliery is that of 
a decline, although there are a few spikes in the trend; specifically levels dropped 
below the overall visible downwards trend in 1846, and climbed above the 
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overall trend for 1847-1848 and 1855. This reduction in new workers fits with 
Church’s interpretation that in the years of the Monthly Bond, mobility was 
reduced281, although as has already been suggested, migration in the years after 
1854 did not see a return to earlier levels which Church ties to the decline of 
small pits.282 Retained workers mirror some of these large spikes which goes 
some way to balancing out increases in new workers- such declining from 1845 
to 1848 (whilst new workers increased). However retained workers do see a large 
upwards spike in 1849. They then follow a gradual downwards trend until 1854, 
when there is a more sudden drop, and sustained lower levels from 1855 
onwards. 
 
The 1847-1848 spike in new workers was likely driven by three factors. Firstly it 
is likely exaggerated by the dip in new worker recruitment in 1846. Additionally 
the Monthly Bond was renegotiated in 1847, which appears to have attracted new 
hewers with various wage increases. However, the sinking of a new pit at Wylam 
in 1848 was certainly the most important factor for the number of new workers 
recruited, especially in the latter year. Additionally this is demonstrated by the 
increase in the number of retained workers in 1849. With the additional 
opportunities for work, an additional number of hewers chose to remain at the 
colliery. The amount of coal produced would also have had some influence here. 
Wylam’s output increased throughout the mid-to-late 1840s, and therefore the 
colliery required more hewers to produce additional coal. Indeed the overall 
number of hewers rose from 42 in 1846 to 50 in 1847 and 52 in 1848, reaching 
its peak of 56 in 1849. 
 
After 1849, retained workers steadily declined until 1854, when there was a 
sharper drop. New workers continuously declined with the exception of 1855. 
The 1855 upwards spike of new workers coincides with the high point of hewers’ 
average wages in our period, which likely encouraged more to bind there. 
However, the accompanying drop in retained workers indicates this may have 
simply been a replacement of lost labour, as it was recruited elsewhere with the 
end of the Monthly Bond. It may initially seem odd that labour would choose to 
                                                 




relocate from a colliery enjoying its highest wages for two decades. However 
Wylam’s hewers were not alone in their prosperity, and they may well have 
attained better terms elsewhere. Additionally, if the Monthly Bond did end in 
1854, then it is unsurprising to see high levels of movement in the year 
afterwards, as workers sought to find the best terms possible. We must also be 
careful not to overstate the size of this movement- whilst a 28 percent new 
worker ratio is higher than the surrounding years, it is certainly not the highest in 
our period. 
 
The mid-1850s was one of the highest points of worker power in the coalfield283- 
with the introduction of a semi-annual Bond (their original demand in 1844) by 
1856 at Wylam. If “the decline of annual hiring”284 had caused a decline in 
internal migration, as Church argues, then its reinstatement should have 
prompted the number of new workers per year to rise again. However, other than 
in 1855, they do not. This suggests that there were other factors at play in 
determining migration in the coalfield during this period.  
 
The final period in our wage data contains only one entry- 1861-1862. As 
previously mentioned, the higher ‘new worker’ rate may have been a 
consequence of the reintroduction of the annual Bond. There is a gap in Wylam’s 
wage data between 1856 and 1860-1861, but we know the annual Bond was 
reintroduced in 1857-1858. Annual bonding at Wylam stands out as a bit of an 
oddity. Colls and Church both agree that the Monthly Bond lasted until 1854.285 
But at this point both seem to imply that annual Bonds were reintroduced 
“probably on a much less rigorous basis than before”.286 Neither mentions semi-
annual bonding, although they do both agree that the miners were in a position of 
strength. Semi-annual Bonds fit with this position- it was what the miners had 
favoured in previous strike action. But it seems strange that there is no reference 
to this in the literature. Church then argues that the owners tried to re-assert the 
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annual Bond in the early 1860s, but this was after our period of study.287 
Retained workers are at a slightly higher level than in the mid-1850s, but not 
significantly so. However new workers are much higher. This is consistent with 
the previously mentioned notion of more labour being available towards the end 
of the period. 
 
Having identified and explained the trends in our data, we now evaluate how 
migration might have impacted standard-of-living and the family economy. As 
will be discussed in The Family section of this investigation, family members 
tended to move to and from collieries together. This means that the decision was 
not always based purely on what the male head of a household could earn, 
instead on what the family could earn as a whole. This may have also been 
influenced by female employments in other industries- usually in agriculture or 
domestic service.288 However, as the bulk of wages would have come from the 
breadwinner and child labour in the mines, it is likely that was a minor influence.  
 
Additionally, as workers rarely stayed at the same colliery for their entire lives, 
their families would be required to move villages with them.289 Single hewers 
may have had an additional propensity to move in search of the best rates, but it 
is unlikely that they accounted for the entirety of internal coalfield migration. 
Colliery housing may have made this easier, but newly married hewers were 
lower down the list for allocation of such housing, which may have adversely 
affected their ability to start a family. Those with full-fledged families were less 
likely to have this problem, but being uprooted on potentially an annual basis 
must have been a traumatic experience. 
 
This factor could also have persuaded some mining families to stay at collieries 
even though they knew that the male breadwinner would be able to get a better 
rate elsewhere. If a hewer’s sons were known to be able to obtain work in the 
colliery, then it may have meant that in order to maximise earning opportunities, 
the best option was to remain. However, the process of the binding meant it 
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would be relatively easy to discover if an entire family could obtain employment 
elsewhere. Other unquantifiable factors, such as loyalty to the owner of a 
particular pit, may also have had a part in persuading some families to stay put. 
 
In summary, we agree with the literature that internal migration was between ten 
and forty percent. We have used a different methodology and data to Hair, so to 
produce similar results is encouraging. However, we feel tracing the causation to 
hiring systems (in other words, the annual and Monthly Bonds), fails to account 
for all factors and does not explain the whole picture. We have explained these 
trends as well as possible with the data available. We have also sought to 
highlight and address the contradiction in Church’s work between advantages 
gained by remaining at the same colliery, and a highly mobile workforce. 
Finally, we have again considered the impact of this on standard-of-living, and 
suggested that the family economy played an additional part in determining 
migration, rather than simply maximising the male-breadwinners’ earnings. The 
effects of families being forced to move on an annual basis has also been 
discussed.  
The Family 
The family was an important part of the mining trade and the mining community. 
Boys were taken into the mines at a young age by their fathers, in order to impart 
the necessary skills to prosper in the profession. They would work their way up 
from trapping and working the switches at ten (or younger), to hewing around the 
age of twenty-one.290 This made the family unit central to the mining trade. We 
opt for a simple, but effective, measure of potential familial relationships. By 
using a sampling technique based on surnames, we have preserved families 
working together in the mine. We then sum those with the same surname. Whilst 
this is by no means a perfect measure, and is unlikely to be completely accurate, 
the preponderance of certain names in the wage data suggests some form of 
connection. Across all workers we find that of the 290 individuals originally 
identified in the paybills, 217 of them had the same surname as someone else in 
the data. Whilst this might be expected for more common surnames such as 
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Armstrong (19) or Ramsey (13) this list includes those such as Varty (10), 
Turnbull (9), Appleby (6) and Cowings (6). This seems far more than co-
incidence.291 
 
Furthermore, we present evidence of those of the same name joining and leaving 
the colliery at similar times. If we take the Varty family as an example, after 
1843, there are consistently six to eight Varty’s visible in the data until 1854, 
when a couple of the longer serving hewers move on. There are then around five 
of this name until the second gap in 1856, with six present in the final year of 
1860-1861. It is also possible to track younger members of the family entering 
the mine, and progression through occupations. Whilst James (1836), Thomas 
(1837) and John (1838) all joined the mine as hewers, Michael first appears in 
1843-1844 as a driver, graduating to putting in 1845, and eventually hewing in 
1850. Similarly, Henderson begins working the switches in 1850, before moving 
on to driving full-time in 1852 (having been doing it as a secondary capacity for 
two years). At this point he vanishes from the data, most likely working in a 
different seam (although it is possible he moved to a different colliery) but 
reappears as a putter in 1855. By 1856 he has picked up secondary hewing 
responsibilities, and became a fully-fledged hewer somewhere between 1856 and 
1860-1861. 
 
Another example are the Appleby’s, although this is more complex. Christian 
and Thomas both started work in 1848 as drivers and working the switches. What 
is interesting is that there appears to be no senior male figure working as a hewer. 
This could be because he was working at another colliery, or this could be an 
example of a family without a male breadwinner, as Humphries claims occurred 
on a regular basis.292 John joined them at Wylam in 1854 as a driver, suggesting 
this was his first employment. There were then three more Appleby’s (William, 
John and ‘H’), who may have been related to those previously mentioned, who 
appear in the colliery records for 1860-1861 and 1861-1862. That all these boys 
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started in junior occupations (trapping and putting) suggest that they may have 
been related. By this point, Christian had achieved the status of hewer, so they 
may have been his children.  
 
The initial lack of a male family head is interesting, as whilst Humphries 
contends 18 percent of British families lacked a male breadwinner through 
mortality and absenteeism293, the hereditary nature of recruiting labour into 
mining would suggest that this would not be as common in this industry. Young 
labour may have been recruited from local families in other industries, but 
without the system of apprenticeships present in other mining regions, it would 
probably have required a personal relationship with someone already working in 
the mine. In any case, the earnings of the boys alone would have been 
insufficient to support a family by themselves. 
 
If we look at some of the entries with fewer occurrences of the same name, it is 
perhaps easier to see the presence of families more explicitly. The Cairns family, 
consisting of James, Peter and Joseph, all joined Wylam in the second half of 
1844 (working as two hewers and a putter respectively) and left again following 
1845. Mark and Thomas Graydon both arrived at Wylam in 1839-1840 (as a 
hewer and a putter) and both left the year after. George and Thomas Muse both 
worked at Wylam between 1848 and 1856. George was the head of the family, a 
hewer. Thomas began trapping, progressing as far as putting in his tenure. A 
second George and Jacob both began work in 1854, working the switches and 
driving. George Jr. left with his two elders in 1856, whilst Jacob disappears from 
the records a year earlier. Whilst this pattern by no means holds in every case, 
there are many more that do. It is hoped these examples help convince the reader 
it is possible to demonstrate qualitatively the importance of family through our 
data. 
 
The Rowntree life-cycle cites several specific times of life at which an individual 
would undergo particularly strong financial strains- emphasising the point that 
poverty was not static. He believed people would be poorest at a young age when 
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they were one of many dependents, when they had a large number of dependents, 
and in old age.294 The comparability between hewers’ and putters’ wages means 
that following these periods, families would enjoy an especially high standard-
of-living in periods afterwards, as children would be earning a higher wage 
whilst they were still in the family home. It therefore seems that the cycle would 
have seen higher peaks and lower troughs in mining villages.  
 
The larger size of mining families also meant they had increased earning 
potential.295 Later in this section we will discuss the potential earnings of mining 
families in relation to family budgets, but it should initially be clear that the 
greater the number of children, the more dependents in early family years but 
also the greater earning potential in later years. Even a trapper could be worth 
around 3000 pence per year to a family. Drivers could contribute another 4000, 
and putters could earn a wage the same as- or in some cases superior to- a hewer, 
around 9000 pence per year. If a family were to have children at two-year 
intervals, and have three children (not uncommon in mining families) there 
would be a period of around four years where all of these children would be 
dependents, until the eldest became ten. This would be a period of financial 
strain- with three extra mouths to feed, the earnings of a single hewer and 
whatever employment his wife could find, would have to suffice. From there 
onwards, things would get significantly better. The additional earnings of each of 
the children (assuming they were male) as they joined the workforce in the mine 
would then contribute to the family’s income until they began to leave home and 
start families of their own. 
 
Miners were expected to move out of hewing and into less physical tasks if they 
reached the age of fifty-five.296 This would also have impacted on their earnings, 
but with few dependents this may not have been overly severe. However, they 
would also have lost colliery housing, which was reserved for hewers. When this 
work (probably still involving significant manual labour) became too much for 
an aging miner he would have been forced out of the industry all together, into a 
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job which he may have had little experience of, having been the mines his entire 
life. This would have undoubtedly reduced his wages further. We should also 
recall the long-term ailments which would likely have affected former hewers by 
this point. Working conditions in the mine hardly encouraged a healthy lifestyle, 
with physical activity often crossing the border to damaging, and inhaling coal 
dust impacting on an individual’s breathing abilities.297 This may well have 
damaged his chances of gaining employment outside the mining industry. 
 
Those in receipt of colliery housing are marked in the paybills, and the terms on 
which it was provided mentioned in the Bonds. Current literature emphasises the 
importance of this housing298, but in our records relatively few hewers appear to 
receive it. Most scholars have noted the almost universal concept that colliery 
housing (although limited) was free to workers and present at every colliery in 
the northern coalfield. Wylam’s Bonds also specify a rent for this housing, which 
seems to contradict this idea. It is therefore hypothesised that those marked as 
receiving accommodation were required to pay for it in those years. In years 
when it was free, it was not noted in these sources. The Bonds also help us to 
value this housing, as they provide those not in receipt of it (for certain years) 
with 720 pence (£3) compensation. The quality of housing has been considered 
poor by much of the literature, at least in the earlier part of our study.299 As was 
earlier mentioned, miners housing was hardly luxurious, although remarkably 
well furnished.300 This indicates that they were acquiring durable goods with 
their disposable income. Houses often consisted of two rooms (including the 
attic, which was often rented), although they were almost universally built of 
stone by the mid-1840s.301  
 
The finding that colliers were required to pay rent is a significant one. As our 
present estimates are lower than those in the literature and we find hewers were 
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expected to pay rent out of this wage in some years, we further downgrade their 
standard-of-living. This should not be overstated; if we assume that rents were £3 
a year (in line with the compensation given to those in years of free housing), this 
converts to 720 pence. Split over 26 fortnights, this equates to 28 pence each. 
This would not drastically affect the pattern of wages, but might alter it enough 
in some cases to influence our conclusions in comparisons to other years. 
 
At present, the best family budgets available are those of Horrell and Humphries. 
These range across a large number of industries and time periods.302 They do 
contain entries for mining, but this is not always coal (tin and ore mines are 
included) and there are few entries from the northern coalfield.303 Using their 
sources, we find the most suitable entries in this regard are those from the Report 
of the Children’s Employment Commission of 1842, in which John Leifchilde, 
Esq. lays out an ‘average expenditure’ for a mining family for a fortnight in the 
Northern coalfield. This is calculated to be £4.7s.10½d. In Leifchilde’s survey, 
the income of an adult hewer, a putter, a driver and a trapper should amply cover 
such expenditure, bringing in a total of £5.3s.7d.304 If we convert these totals into 
pence to make a direct comparison to our wage rates, we see an expenditure of 
1054.5 pence and an income of 1243 pence. The family budget contains mutton 
and bacon, as well as flour, oatmeal and muslin, all of which might be considered 
relatively standard in the family budgets of this period. There is however 
considerable expenditure on butter, milk, tea, sugar and coffee, with a sizable 
tobacco and beer allowance. The food portion of the budget totals £3.0s.10½d. 
The rest is portioned between shoes, sundries and clothing- the latter of which 
also constituting considerable expenditure.305 This is in line with the notion 
above that miners purchased durable and semi-durable goods with their 
disposable income. 
 
We shall now compare this budget to our own data. Firstly, let us consider our 
sample. Unfortunately, we do not have wage data for 1842. Instead, let us use 
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1843-1844. A hewer in this year averaged 295 pence per fortnight, a putter 274, a 
driver 138, and a trapper 41. This totals 748 pence, a far cry from the 1243 
Leifchilde claims to be the norm. These wages rates are undeniably low- 
especially that of the trapper (which is based only on one entry), but that the rates 
for each occupation were all low in the same year suggests a depression in wages 
across the industry. Therefore let us also consider the last year we do have wage 
data for before the report- 1840-1841. In this scenario, a hewer averaged 360 
pence per fortnight, a putter 310, a driver 147 and a trapper 94. This totals 911 
pence per fortnight, closer to but still significantly short of Leifchilde’s totals.  
 
Let us then ask ourselves what the families in our sample could afford. The 
difference between the 1840-1841 income and budget is 143.5, and the 1843-
1844 306.5 pence. What could the family have ceased to consume? The first 
thing to go would have been luxury items. Removing coffee would have saved 
the family 36 pence, as would consuming half the amount of butter and milk. The 
clothing allowance, the single largest expenditure, would also likely have been 
cut. Reducing this by half would save 105 pence. This brings us within the 1840-
1841 budget. In times of more severe austerity- as seems to have been the case in 
1843-1844, all luxuries might have to have been foregone. Keeping half the 
amount of milk and butter, but losing coffee, tea and sugar, would save 114 
pence. Retaining a halved clothing allowance saves 105 pence again. We still 
need to save another 86.5 pence, so reducing mutton consumption from fourteen 
pounds to ten pounds, flour from five stone to four stone, and bacon from 
fourteen pounds to ten pounds saves 94 pence. It is therefore possible that miners 
could have survived on these incomes, but they could not have enjoyed the same 






Table 1- Comparison Between our Hypothetical Mining Family and 
Leifchilde's Estimates. (Source: Own calculations and Great Britain. 
Parliament. House of Commons, Children’s Employment Commission- First 
Report of the Commissioners- Mines, 1842. Appendix One. [electronic 
Resource]. (Cambridge eng: Proquest LLC, 2006), 536.) 





































748 1054.5 306.5 1243 495 
1843-
1844 
911 1054.5 143.5 1243 332 
 
 
What might have motivated Leifchilde in his reporting? His commentary before 
presenting this budget suggests that the data were collected “from several 
instances”306 and was “very far from an extreme case”.307 The family in his 
selection is around average- the same report claims an average family size of 
4.5.308 And this should (in theory) be one of the more affluent times of life for the 
family- with four people in employment, two of whom were earning ‘adult’ 
wages. Therefore, the difference between the two is somewhat surprising. The 
1843-1844 estimate certainly seems to have been the low point of the period, and 
by a significant margin. If we consider these to be times of extreme austerity, 
then it is unsurprising that a mining family would be unable to afford what 
appears to be a relatively well-off basket of goods. The 1840-1841 comparison 
should therefore be preferred. Whilst there is still a rather sizable gap, this could 
easily have been account for by the general skill of the hewer and putter in many 
families. Leifchilde also seems to be of the opinion that miners were rather well 
off309, and therefore in constructing this basket may well have taken better off 
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examples to reinforce this view. Of course, Wylam could simply have been an 
exception with especially low wages. However, it was not an insignificant 
colliery, and a gulf between it and the rest of the coalfield would create more 
questions than it answered- especially with the mobile labour market 
demonstrated in the previous section. 
 
We additionally consider a budget from a Northumberland agricultural family, 
which was also under a bonded labour system, as a point of comparison. 
Agricultural workers were bound under the Hind system, which like the Pitmen’s 
Bond, allowed them specified payments (in cash and in kind) in return for their 
labour, for yearly intervals. Unlike the Pitmen’s Bond, the agricultural labourer 
was also required to provide the labour of his wife (or a female servant) when 
required by the farmer. He was also given perks as part of his contract; for 
example, grass for a cow was specified (see Appendix Four for a more detailed 
discussion).310 
 
The yearly income of this family (including goods in kind) was £76.0s.10d, with 
expenditure calculated to be £75.13s.7d in 1837. Most of this was in the form of 
goods- only £4 was received in wages of the male breadwinner, although 
employment of his wife and his sixteen, twelve and ten year old sons provided an 
additional £26.6s.0d in monetary wages. The family is said to have three other 
dependent children (the youngest three months old). Like a mining family, a 
large proportion of the family’s earnings was accounted for by child labour.311 
The added female employment is something not accounted for by our data, so we 
must bear this in mind when making comparisons.  
 
The family was located in Chillingham, Northumberland (less than 50 miles from 
Wylam). An annual income of £75.13s.7d for our Northumberland labourers 
converts to 18163 pence per year. If we compare our miners wages from 1838-
1839, the average wage of a hewer was 332 pence per fortnight. This converts to 
8632 pence per year. This, clearly, is far short of the wages generated by the 
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labourer, but this is an unfair comparison as the labourer’s entire family are 
included in the earnings.  
 
A putter’s average wage was 323 pence per fortnight in 1838-1839, or 8398 
pence per year. Together, this makes 17030 pence per year- not equal to the 
expenditure of this agricultural family, but far closer than the hewers wage alone. 
This seems to be a fair comparison to the male breadwinner and his sixteen year 
old son, but the two younger sons and the labourers’ wife are still unaccounted 
for in our hypothetical mining family. The boys in 1838 would likely have been 
trappers or drivers. As agricultural labourers tended to have undergone plenty of 
physical exercise, let us assume that the twelve year old was physically capable 
of driving, and his younger brother trapping. These yield fortnightly rates of 159 
and 112 pence. Converted, these give the family an extra 4134 pence and 2912 
pence per year. Now our mining family appears to be doing very well- together 
this makes 24076 pence per year, even before factoring in any female 
employment. This exceeds the agricultural labourers’ family income of 18163 by 
5913 pence per year. 
 
However, whilst this may initially seem that mining families were better off than 
their agricultural counterparts (and indeed, in this example they appear to have 
been), there are several issues that need to be addressed. Firstly, the agricultural 
family kept a variety of livestock, including a cow. They would therefore have 
been able to enjoy some of its produce without incurring additional expense. 
Whilst it is true that enclosure had removed the access of labourers to common 
land, and therefore owning livestock, Hindmarsh and Greg, contemporaries 
writing in 1838, claim that the Hind system provided a means for families to do 
this, with their master’s providing the land for it to be kept.312 Whilst it is likely 
that this did not occur in all cases, this may well have been part of the hind 
agreement. Hindmarsh’s report may well have been overly positive in places, but 
as was much contemporary reporting. This agricultural family may have been a 
little atypical, but at present no better family budget has been identified for 
comparison. 
                                                 




Secondly, when we break down the income of these two families, we see that 
much of the difference in income is due to child labour. According to the same 
source, an agricultural worker and his wife would have been able to generate 15s 
6d per week if they had no children capable of working.313 This converts into 
9672 pence per year. As already discussed, the average hewers’ wage for the 
same year was 8632 pence. Whilst his wife may have been able to supplement 
his income to some extent, it is unlikely this would have raised the household’s 
income significantly above that of the agricultural labourer. As Table 2 shows, it 
was in utilising child labour that the mining family moved ahead in income. Each 
child contributed significantly more than their agricultural counterpart. Whilst 
this is not a perfect comparison, as the ten year old agricultural child was only 
employed part time, whereas the ten year old mining child was in full 
employment, the difference is striking- especially with regards to the sixteen year 
olds. This demonstrates that it was not that the adult male who was better paid in 
mining families, but that the family economy provided a higher standard-of-
living. This is more clearly demonstrated by graph 18 and graph 19 which show 
the proportion of annual earnings which each family member contributed. Whilst 
the children undoubtedly contribute a sizable proportion of the income of the 
agricultural family’s income (40 percent), this is far smaller than the contribution 
of the mining family’s income, where child labour contributes 64 percent.  
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Source: Own calculations. 
 
Finally, this hypothetical mining family’s first three children were all male 
children. This means that they were all able to be employed in the mines. The 
statistical probability of this happening is around 12 percent. Whilst girls could 
have potentially found work in other industries, this was relatively limited in 
mining villages and not as valuable. This would therefore have reduced the 
income of the family. 
Table 2- Child Earnings in Agricultural and Mining Families, 1838. (Source: 
Own calculations and Hindmarsh, On the State of Agriculture and Condition of 
the Agricultural Labourers of the Northern Division of Northumberland, 405.) 
Child Agricultural 
Family Earnings- 









10 Year Old 624 2912 2288 
12 Year Old 1872 4134 2262 
16 Year Old 3840 8398 4558 
 
Additionally, we must consider if this comparison is a fair one. Flinn found on 
the Tyne average family size was 4.75314, with an average 1.95 members 
“employed in the mines”315. Whilst this is from 1815, it is probably the best 
estimate we have, as it was taken from a survey of the Coal Owners Association. 
It is also close to the estimate of 4.5 provided by the Commission investigating 
                                                 




mines and collieries.316 This suggests that comparison to a family of eight is 
unfair, as realistic family sizes of miners were much smaller. However, we have 
constructed our hypothetical mining estimates to account for this. 
 
If we consider Flinn’s family size, we would likely have two family members 
working in the mine. Usually, one of these would have been a hewer. The other 
would likely have worked his way through the mine as he got older. If we 
continue to use 1838-1839 as an example, a hewer with one son working as a 
driver would have seen an annual income of 12766 pence per year. A hewer with 
a putter son would see an annual income of 17030, as has already been 
established. The step between a driver and a putter’s wage can therefore be seen 
as a significant gain in earnings, which would go a long way towards his family’s 
welfare and standard-of-living. Whilst the gap may be a little exaggerated (a boy 
would likely earn above average in his final year of driving, and below average 
in his first year of putting), the gap remains substantial. If experience really was 
the key to progression through occupations, then it is understandable why 
children were taken into the mines at such an early age. 
 
This changed slightly with the 1842 Mines and Collieries Act, which restricted 
the age at which children could work in the mines to ten years old.317 How well 
these restrictions were enforced is questionable and realistically it just seems to 
have delayed entry into the mine by a couple of years at most. However it did 
mean when children started work in the mine, they were expected to fulfil their 
task on a more regular basis. This has been seen with the increase in trappers’ 
wages (and other similar workers) due to additional time being worked in the 
mine.  
 
As has been mentioned in the comparison of family budgets, women are not 
accounted for by our data. As our wages are drawn directly from mine records of 
underground workers, women do not feature in them. It has already been 
established in the literature that women very rarely participated in mining in the 
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Northeast. Indeed, this practise had died out long before the period of this study, 
regardless of its existence in other mining regions until 1842.318 Our results 
provide nothing to contradict this evidence. Our sample yielded no overtly 
female names, and women were not mentioned in the Bonds. More than this 
would simply be speculation, as we currently have no direct evidence on the lives 
of women in Wylam. 
 
This section has considered a broad range of factors related to ‘the family’. We 
first considered family labour in the mines, and used surnames of underground 
employees in conjunction with their working years and occupations to suggest 
familial links. We then considered the Rowntree poverty-cycle, and the 
implications this would have had for the family and their standard-of-living. 
Colliery housing was then discussed, along with its allocation and value. Family 
budgets from labourers in the same and similar industries were then evaluated 
and compared by constructing a hypothetical mining family based on these 
family’s structures. Mining families were seen to be dependent on the utilisation 
of child labour in order to gain additional income, in comparison to an 
agricultural family in 1838. The incomes of adult hewers alone were comparable 
to that of agricultural workers without children who were able to work. 
Additionally, our miners fall short of the basket-of-goods which the 1842 report 
assigns to them in the Northeast, but this does not necessarily mean that our 
figures are too low, as this basket may well be unrepresentative of mining 
families in general. Finally, we noted the lack of women’s labour in our data, and 
acknowledge the need to account for it in future investigations. 
Other Factors Relating to Earnings 
Recent studies have used ‘hewers’ and ‘putter-hewers’ as a criterion for selection 
of workers.319 It has been the intention of this study to demonstrate that many 
workers took shifts in different occupations, although at this stage it is not 
possible to numerically demonstrate how regular these shifts were. We have 
already established that on average 39 percent of hewers took a shift in another 
capacity per year. Contemporary accounts claim that men might partake in this 
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practise of equally splitting their time between putting and hewing for a year 
before moving into hewing full time.320 39 percent is higher than the number of 
hewers who would be in their first year hewing full-time. The practise of taking 
shifts in other occupations must therefore have permeated beyond those 
designated as ‘putter-hewers’. Additionally, further investigation has been 
undertaken through analysis of the Pitmen’s Bond. It is accepted that the social 
status of hewers was higher than other underground workers. However, the role 
of a ‘putter-hewer’ was never specifically established in Wylam’s Bonds, and 
therefore we suggest the extent to which historians have seen this as a distinct 
category of worker is overstated.  
 
The Bonds for Wylam refer mainly to the terms of work for hewers. They go into 
a great amount of detail describing the rights and conditions attached to their 
employment. They also refer to putters, although this is usually only one 
paragraph in the entire document. This investigation has not found mention of 
‘putter-hewers’. We must therefore query their inclusion in the literature as a 
distinction between workers. Hewers were obviously regarded as the elite- 
despite the similarity between hewers and putters wages- due to the weighting of 
clauses devoted to them, and the provisions which applied only to hewers. Only 
hewers received a daily rate when participating in work other than their 
contracted occupation and they were also the householders in the colliery. They 
were also subjected to fines for workmanship. These points have been mentioned 
elsewhere in this study, but they are worth repeating here to emphasise the status 
of the hewer. Whilst contemporaries may have viewed some men who were 
transitioning between putting and hewing as ‘putter-hewers’, they legally had no 
different status in the Bond. Additionally, their contemporaries were also taking 
shifts in other occupations, albeit likely less regularly. With so many workers 
taking shifts in other occupations, it seems unfair to discount these workers on 
such a basis.  
 
This study has already analysed the general pattern of wages, and emphasised 
that fluctuations in yearly earnings and the deviation of wages should be seen as 
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important as average levels. It will now address the how the skill of individuals 
affected their pay. It seems obvious that in occupations paid by a piece rate, some 
hewers or putters would simply be better at their jobs than others- due to superior 
physical strength or an ability to ‘sense’ the coal. This, of course, must be true to 
some extent. However, the process of cavilling meant that scholars have assigned 
a certain amount of luck to earnings.321 To investigate this, we have looked at the 
trends of selected workers over a long period. Hewers who worked continuously 
in the mine for an extended period were chosen.322 We then evaluated their 
relative earning levels- did they always earn above or below average, or did this 
change with the year? The first simple measure of our sample of ten hewers was 
to consider if they consistently earned above or below the average wage. Four 
consistently earned above average, three consistently earned below average, and 
there were a further three who fluctuated. For those that fluctuated, two appear to 
have long runs of consistency at various points in their employment history, but 
this was not always at the beginning or end. This suggests that hewer skill did 
play a large part, with other factors (such as the part of the face to be worked) 
playing a minor role.  
 
The next step was to investigate the dispersion of these earnings. A hewer could 
be consistently above or below average but still fluctuate wildly. The standard 
deviation of year-on-year earnings for each individual hewer in this sample was 
as much as 89 pence, and as little as 22 pence. The average was 59 pence. 
Compared to the variation of average wages within our data, this standard 
deviation seems to imply consistency within workers. Some movement would 
have occurred due to changes in piece rates, different numbers of working days, 
individual effort and cavilling. The final point should not be overstated- the 
“gamble of a lottery”323 which Colls describes does not seem as substantial as 
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might be suspected. Hewers’ age would also account for some of these changes- 
the output of older hewers would begin to fall off as their physical strength 
waned, whereas younger hewers would gain wages as they benefitted from 
experience.   
 
Finally, we have ranked all hewers in each year by fortnightly earnings. We have 
then selected those in our sample, and recorded where they fell within hewers as 
a whole. These were then converted into earnings percentiles to account for the 
varying number of hewers in any given year. Top hewers (who earned the most)  
would have been classified as one percent. This pattern is far less clear than the 
previous two measures have suggested. To simplify these trends, graph 20 has 
been constructed. Here we have converted the percentiles to deciles. This allows 
us to keep the majority of the fluctuations in the data, but allow the trends to be 
more easily identified.  
 
There is still lots of movement in graph 20, so to simplify things further we have 
separated out those previously identified as consistently earning above average, 
below average, and fluctuating. Graph 20.1 therefore contains workers 1, 5, 6 
and 7, graph 20.2 shows workers 2, 3 and 9, and graph 20.3 shows workers 4, 8 
and 10. All of graph 20.2 seem to be decreasing over time. This means that they 
were likely older hewers reaching the end of their careers, or suffering from 
gradually worsening illness or injuries. On graph 20.3 workers 4 and 8 both 
show increasing ranks, apart from the odd year probably affected by illness, 
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absenteeism or injury. Despite fluctuating around the average wage, this suggests 
they have been younger hewers making their way up in the mine. The other entry 
on this graph, worker 10, appears to gradually gain in rank on the whole, before 
declining. He then seems to undergo some form of revival in the late 1850s/early 
1860s. This could be in comparison to his skill level with new labour, or he could 
have been disabled by some debilitating factor in the middle period from which 
he then recovered. Graph 20.1 is more difficult to explain. Worker 1, apart from 
one year, seems to rank highly as a hewer. His shorter tenure suggests he may 
well have joined and left Wylam in his prime. The same could be said for worker 
5. Worker 7 seems to be ranking rather highly for the most part, but the general 
downwards trajectory of his rank from 1850 onwards suggests he may have been 
past his prime years. Worker 6 is all over the place, which could be a case of 
worker effort, or he could have been particularly badly affected by Colls’ 
“gamble of a lottery”324. 





So what can we conclude from these three related inquiries? Our analysis of 
hewers’ wages in relation to the average suggests that there was some continuity 
in hewers’ wages. This speaks to skill being a factor- something which the 
miners themselves always maintained- but also that whilst the process of 
cavilling could have an impact, it was not the primary determinant in wages. Our 
analysis of the ranks of hewers relative to others in the same year suggest that 
there was also continuity, but clearly showed that earnings were not static- 
hewers moved up and down the rankings as they gained experience, or aged and 
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became less physically able. Additionally, almost all of our sample had one year 
which didn’t fit with the rest of their earnings. This embodies the varied and 
unpredictable nature of coal mining. Injuries and accidents occurred, which could 
inhibit the ability of miners to go about their work. Even if they were not 
completely prevented from working, there were years where this could impact on 
their earnings. 
 
The final issue is that of maximum and minimum earnings. Restriction was either 
seen as a way of limiting competition between hewers by the Unions, or by 
ensuring there was more work to go around by the workers, depending on which 
view in the literature you subscribe to.325 It is not the aim of this study to 
comment on this debate, but to establish if restriction was actually a problem for 
many hewers. We do not know how many of Wylam’s workers were members of 
the Union, but as productivity would have been comparable across the coalfield, 
this is not an issue. If earnings were lower than the restriction limit this would 
not have been a problem either way. If we find earnings at the limit (if there was 
a union presence) or above (if there was not), then we know that restriction 
would have had an impact. This task is made more difficult by the lack of daily 
wage data. However, by calculating what the ‘restriction rate’ would have 
translated into for fortnightly pay, we can see if any hewers actually got near this 
limit.  
 
Colls gives the level of restriction as 4s.6d per day.326 This converts to 54 pence 
per day. In a standard six day working week, this means that a hewer should not 
have earned over 648 pence per fortnight. Of all entries for hewers, there are ten 
which earn over this threshold in a year. Of these ten entries, four also worked in 
additional jobs which seem to have been more lucrative than hewing, and 
therefore we should not view them as having earned all of their wages in the 
restricted capacity. The other two also worked as putters, and may have bypassed 
restriction in that manner. Four appeared to only work as hewers, but three of 
these are from 1861-1862, long after the 1825 estimate, and long after hewing 
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was said to have been deskilled.327 The final entry is from 1854, and does contain 
some large fortnightly entries. The average is also based on one of the fewest 
number of fortnights allowed in the sample. However, these entries are all taken 
directly from the paybills, which lends to their validity. 
 
There are two other possibilities- there may be a problem with the reconstruction 
of employment histories for these individuals (although efforts were made to 
ensure this was not the case), or they may have been disguised ‘gang working’ 
entries in the paybills. There were three additional entries which may be 
considered ‘close’ to this limit (averaging over 600 pence per fortnight), but all 
of these can be explained by the same factors. 
 
These results were somewhat to be expected, for the reasons outlined above, but 
it was important to establish this was the case. The area with potential cases of 
hewers working at or near restriction would be on a fortnightly basis. Therefore, 
we have also evaluated individual fortnightly entries. Using a sample of workers- 
all those with a surname beginning with ‘A’- fortnightly earnings were compared 
to the cap of restriction. This led to the discovery that instances where hewers 
earned over restriction, or where they were close enough to restriction that they 
would likely have had to reduce their output, occurred on 112 occasions of 1648 
fortnightly paybills- or around 7 percent of cases. This total includes those who 
exceeded the limit due to earnings in secondary occupations. It therefore seems 
that whilst restriction could, and did, play a role in the output of some workers, it 
was not particularly widespread.  
 
Perhaps more interesting is if we consider supposed minimum earnings. The 
Bond states that a hewer will receive “not less work than will yield to them, at 
the aforementioned rates, the sum of “thirty shillings” in each fortnight”328 This 
means that a fortnight of work should not have yielded a hewer less than 360 
pence. This initially seems problematic, as twelve of our twenty-two measured 
Bond periods average below this value. However, the Bond specifies that the 
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owner may lay the mine off for twelve of forty-two days, and the hewers would 
still only be entitled to the same minimum wages. Church has suggested that the 
working week for miners in this period was rarely six days, and Kirby has 
demonstrated that Wylam was laid off relatively frequently in his sample.329 
Kirby attributes “cessations of production”330 to “a management decision based 
on geological or technical difficulties, or short-term demand shocks”.331 
Additionally, it seems that fines would have been imposed after this limit, so the 
hewer may well have earned this minimum wage, but have been fined down 
below it. Furthermore, Church contends that this feature may have been dropped 
from the Bonds in the 1840s,332 although the annual Bond was later re-
instated.333 
 
This section has looked to address a number of issues relating to earnings in the 
mine. It has focussed for the most part on hewers, and finds that ‘putter-hewers’ 
did not feature as much as they have in the literature, due to the large number of 
workers with secondary employments. It also finds a large degree of continuity 
in year on year earnings of hewers, suggesting cavilling was not as significant as 
has been previously suggested. Finally, it finds that restriction was a factor for 
some hewers, but in most cases the limit was not an attainable level of work. 
Indeed, it seems that minimum earnings may well have been more of an issue. 
Although average earnings were below the supposed minimum set out in the 
Bond for several years, these do not take into account fines and days for which 
the pit was laid off. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, despite not being a perfect measure, our findings tell us much 
about the living standards of these miners during the period 1836-1862. We 
know that average wages overall were static through this period, but that due to 
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cyclical fluctuations, this was actually a result of a large drop off between 1856 
and the early-1860s, with a gradual increase in the year before 1856. This tells us 
that income would have changed throughout the period, and that standard-of-
living would rarely have been static. The changes in wages of miners- especially 
hewers and putters- on a fortnightly basis meant that income was always 
uncertain, which may have caused periods of scarce resources for mining 
families.  
 
The dispersion of wages around the mean values for each year is a factor which 
is ignored by most wage studies. By presenting them here, we look to emphasise 
how different the experiences’ of workers could be, which is ignored by simply 
providing the mean value. This means that not all mining families shared in the 
gains or losses of others, again emphasising the wealth of different experiences 
even for those living within the same village. 
 
In comparison to the existing literature, we estimate that wages were lower than 
Church has previously asserted for the North-east, but are more comparable with 
his national levels. Using both Church’s and Clark’s indices, we show that real 
wages followed the pattern of nominal wages closely. We highlight the mid-
1850s as the peak of the mining family’s prosperity in the North-east, and the 
early-1840s as the lowest. 
 
The relative levels of putters’ and hewers’ wages has direct consequences for 
standard-of-living. As putters were able to earn an equivalent wage to hewers, 
this means that they were able to bring more income into their household earlier 
in their career than previously assumed. This could drastically improve the 
purchasing power of the family, and therefore improve standard-of-living. 
However, coal miners tended to have large families (in order the maximise their 
income) which would have put strain on the limited resources of single-male 
breadwinner families when there were lots of dependents and with only one wage 
earner. This would have exaggerated the peaks and troughs of the Rowntree 




We have also seen from a comparison with an agricultural family budget that 
mining families were better paid, but that this came from child labour rather than 
the male breadwinner. Boys who could be sent down the pit were very valuable 
to their households, and could help to supplement the adult male’s income. This 
was especially important for mining families, as the mining trade was so isolated 
and recruited from within as much as possible. The need to learn the craft meant 
that children were introduced to the mine as young as possible, which would 
have had unfortunate consequences for their long-term standard-of-living. The 
pit would have undoubtedly affected their health negatively, however it would 
also have forced them to develop well physically, in order to cope with the 
strains which mining jobs put upon their bodies.  
 
So far, all of our discussion of living standards has been related to income. 
However, as we point out earlier in this study, income can only illustrate part of 
the picture. We have made efforts to use our wage data as fully as possible, by 
considering the different ways in which wages could affect standard-of-living, 
but there are some aspects which it is not possible to address using these alone.  
 
We know that miners had certain benefits from the Pitmen’s Bonds, such as 
access to medical care. This generally signifies a better standard-of-living, but as 
we have no data on how effective this care was, it is difficult to quantify. 
Additionally, we know that some mining families were provided with housing. 
We also know that these houses lacked sufficient sanitation, and access to water 
was a big problem. This signifies a lower standard-of-living, which is supported 
by the conditions in which a miner was working. The pits were not healthy 
places to be, with risks of injury and long term illness.  
 
We therefore see that miners were compensated for poor sanitary conditions with 
monetary benefits, much like Voth’s urban workers mentioned previously. How 
we judge a miners’ standard-of-living therefore rest heavily on how we weight 
these different components. Including non-income related standard-of-living is 
yet to be approached in any quantitative manner, but may be a fruitful avenue of 
future research. Additionally, whilst we can be aware of environmental factors 




We have also discussed cross-occupational working as being key to progressing 
within the mining trade. Thinking about this within the context of standard-of-
living, it likely meant that young boys were forced into jobs which they were not 
physically ready to take on. This could have been done by a parent, in order to 
increase their earnings, or by an overman, or in order to fill a vacant spot. It also 
meant that those working double shifts may have driven themselves to the point 
of exhaustion, detrimentally affecting their health. 
 
Within the context of this investigation, migration has also been discussed. 
Again, migration does not have an obvious effect on standard-of-living, until we 
consider the relatively traumatic experience of a family being uprooted and 
moved on a yearly basis. This is not something that can be easily included in 
quantitative investigations of living standards, but it must undoubtedly have 
impacted on the social interactions of the family, being forced to re-establish 
themselves in new environments on a regular basis. 
 
There are also aspects of standard-of-living which we have been unable to 
address in this study. We have very little information on education (apart from 
the presence of a colliery school) and even less on religion at Wylam. This 
means that assessing access to learning is not possible at this time. Additionally, 
whilst there are general statistics for life expectancy for miners in the Northern 
coalfield, our data fail to include anything which might give us an indication of 
this for those born (or working) in Wylam.  
 
Overall, wages do explain a lot about standard-of-living in Wylam. The ability to 
purchase goods and services was directly related to income, and the quantities 
and qualities of these goods would have had a direct effect on the living 
standards of mining families. Throughout the study we have tried to use wages in 
a manner to give a more complete view of earnings, rather than simply 
presenting the average trend over the period. We can conclude that whilst miners 
were likely better off those than employed in some other industries in terms of 
income, their environmental conditions left much to be desired. There are aspects 
of standard-of-living which are not able to quantitatively measure, such as health 
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and education, but future research will hopefully allow us to include these factors 
in a more wide ranging standard-of-living measure. Using wages as a proxy may 
have its weaknesses, but it can aid us in our understanding of the living standards 































Appendix One: Wylam Colliery Pitmen’s Bonds 
 





                                                 
334 “Wylam Colliery Pitmen’s Bonds, 1787-1867,” 1787 1867, Blackett Colliery Records, 





Start Date End Date Signing Date (if 
different) 
1794-1795 Annual 23rd October 23rd October   





1804-1805 Annual 20th October 20th 
November 
  
1806-1807 Annual 20th October 20th October   
1811 Semi-
Annual 
19th January 5th April   
1813-1814 Annual 20th March 5th April   
1814-1815 Annual 19th March 5th April   
1815-1816 Annual 18th March 5th April   
1821-1822 Annual 5th April 5th April 23rd March 
1822-1823 Annual 23rd March 5th April   
1823-1824 Annual 22nd March 5th April   
1827-1828 Annual 5th April 5th April 24th March 
1829-1830 Annual 5th April 5th April 23rd March 
1834-1835 Annual 5th April 5th April 22nd March 
1837-1838 Annual 5th April 5th April 18th March 
1838-1839 Annual 5th April 5th April 17th March 
1839-1840 Annual 5th April 5th April 16th March 
1840-1841 Annual 5th April 5th April 21st March 
1841-1842 Annual 5th April 5th April 20th March 
1843-1844 Annual 5th April 5th April 18th March 
1844 Monthly 5th April     
1847 Monthly 3rd February     
1856 Semi-
Annual 
5th April 5th October   
1856-1857 Semi-
Annual 
5th October 5th April 20th September 
1857-1858 Annual 5th April 5th April 21st March 
1858-1859 Annual 5th April 5th April 17th March 
1859-1860 Annual 5th April 5th April 19th March 
1860-1861 Annual 5th April 5th April 17th March 




Appendix Two: Piece and Daily Rates 
 
Piece rates varied by the seam in which the hewer was working. Wet work and 
working in the broken yielded different rates, but these were more of the 
exception than the rule, and therefore are not discussed in great detail here. It was 
the general rate which was the subject of negotiations, and tells us more about 
the relative power of owners and workers in the coal field. Graph 21 shows the 
general level of piece rates over the period. The ‘Five Quarter’ seam is mainly 
hidden from view in the graph, as it was paid at the same rate as the ‘Six Quarter’ 
for all years between 1837-1838 and the first monthly bond in 1844. It is then 
paid at the same rate as the ‘Yard’ seam until 1856, and witnesses its own pay 
rate for the semi-annual Bond in 1856, before returning to the same level as the 
‘Five Quarter’ for the rest of the period. The ‘Main’ seam only joins the data in 
1856, as this is the first time it is mentioned; hence the lack of data beforehand. 
 
 
There is a little uncertainty regarding piece rates during the years of the Monthly 
Bond. If a Monthly Bond changed the rate after 1847 but did not survive, then 
we would have no record of it. But there is no evidence to suggest that this was 
the case, so the rate has been applied for all years between Bonds. As we can see, 
the ‘Horsley Wood’ seam was the best paid at Wylam, likely because it yielded 
the best and most desirable coal. This reached the rate of 90 pence per tub 
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(7s.6d.) at its peak. The ‘Five Quarter’ and ‘Six Quarter’ were generally the 
lowest paid for the earlier part of the period, but they achieved better rates than 
the ‘Main’ seam from 1856. The lowest point of all was in the Bond year of 
1843-44, at 42 pence per tub (3s.6d.). These rates could differ rather drastically, 
and therefore make a large difference to the income of an individual hewer. The 
process of cavilling also meant that hewers could move between seams during a 
Bond year, which could cause a sharp rise or fall in his earnings. 
 
Piece rates for putters were largely stationary over the period. Whilst the size of 
the corf changed from 16 peck to 20 peck between 1843-1844 and the 1844 
Monthly Bond, the putters’ wage was determined by the number of tubs he could 
transport a particular distance. This distance changed at the very beginning of our 
period, between 1837-1838 and 1838-1839, from 60 to 80 yards. Throughout the 
period, an additional pence was paid for every additional 20 yards a putter was 
required to transport a tub over this threshold. As we can see from graph 22 the 
low point of the series (like that of hewers) was 1843-1844, when a putter was 
paid only 11 pence per tub. From 1847 onwards, he was consistently paid 14 
pence (1s.2d.) per tub, which was also the maximum for this period. The scale of 





Daily rates for trappers, switchworkers and drivers took a different pattern during 
this period, showing far less variation. This said, it appears that rates for these 
jobs were more negotiable throughout the year than piece rates were. The 
paybills provide examples of different individuals being paid different rates for 
the same job. However, these were usually exceptions, likely due to the age of 
the boy involved, and the standing of his father within the mine (those on better 
terms with the overmen or viewers were probably sometimes able to obtain better 
rates for their children). The standard rates for drivers, trappers and switchmen 
are presented in graph 23, in order to aid comparison. As we can see, trappers are 
consistently paid less than drivers, at 10 pence per day in comparison to 15 pence 
(1s.3d.) or 14 pence (1s.2d.) for the majority of the period. This reflected the 
status of younger boys working a less physical job. Switchworkers, who for our 
purposes have been grouped with trappers, for the most part occupy the middle 
ground (apart from a brief period in the mid-1850s where they suddenly receive a 
pay increase). It is anticipated that this may cause the reader to query why 
trappers and switchmen have been grouped together. The reason for this is that 
there was significant cross-over between those working in each occupation. Over 
one third of those primarily working as a trapper or switchmen worked as the 
other, when counting cumulative Bond years. When counting those who had no 
other occupation, this covers 60 percent of entries. The remainder spend some 




Daily rates were largely static over the period of our study, and therefore it was 
probably the amount of work available which governed the earnings of junior 
mine workers. This could be a consequence of days of inactivity due to reduced 
demand. It should also be recalled that many drivers would also have participated 















































Output statistics (presented in graph 24 have been taken from the Produce Books 
of Wylam Colliery335, avaliable in the Blackett collection at Woodhorn 
Mueseum. These records account for the total amount of coal produced by the 
colliery by each seam. The coal produced was recorded on a fortnightly basis, 
and tabulated at the end of each calendar year. Given in chaldrons, the total 
















                                                 
335 “Wylam Colliery Produce Books,” 1868 1795, Blackett Colliery Records, Northumberland 
Collections Service, Woodhorn Museum, Ashington. 
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Appendix Four: Agricultural Hiring in the Northeast 
 
The Hind system of agricultural hiring in the Northeast provides an interesting 
comparison to that of the Pitmen’s Bond. Hinds (who differed from regular 
agricultural day labourers) were hired on an annual basis336, and provided with 
housing, goods, and facilities for keeping animals.337 Wages were mainly paid in 
kind, which made the relative profitability for both the worker and the farmer 
dependent on market prices.338 A Hind was required to provide female labour 
(either that of his wife, or a hired female servant known as a Bondager) when 
required by the farmer; usually this was at busy times of the year such as the 
harvest.339 Other members of the family were also often employed during these 
periods.340 These usually yielded cash wages.341 The Hind generally had 
responsibility for livestock, a sign of prestige among agricultural labourers in the 
Northeast during this period. They also typically owned some of their own 
livestock (usually a cow), and were provided with space and materials to 
maintain it as part of their contract.342 
 
Some scholars have suggested that this system was a reaction to the draw of the 
mining industry on labour343, but the collective identity and protective nature of 
the mining community limited the inter-industry movement.344 It therefore seems 
more likely that the system was employed due to the constant need of a labourer 
on the farm to tend to livestock.345 
 
                                                 
336 Alun Howkins, “Types of Rural Communities,” in The Agrarian History of England and 
Wales, vol. 7 part 2, n.d., 1314. 
337 W. H. Charlton, “A Statistical Report from the Parish of Bellingham in the County of 
Northumberland,” Journal of the Statistical Society of London 1, no. 7 (November 1, 1838): 424; 
Hindmarsh, “On the State of Agriculture and Condition of the Agricultural Labourers of the 
Northern Division of Northumberland,” 404. 
338 Hindmarsh, “On the State of Agriculture and Condition of the Agricultural Labourers of the 
Northern Division of Northumberland,” 410. 
339 Howkins, “Types of Rural Communities,” 1314. 
340 Ibid. 
341 A. Howkins, Reshaping Rural England 1850-1925: A Social History (London: Unwin Hyman, 
1990), 51. 
342 John Bailey and George Cully, General View of the Agriculture of the County of 
Northumberland; with Observations on the Means of Its Improvement (London, 1800), 175–176. 
343 Michael C. Kelly, “Collieries and Agricultural Labour in Nineteenth-Century 
Northumberland,” International Journal of Social Science and Humanity 4, no. 4 (2014): 321. 
344 Ibid., 323. 
345 Ibid., 322. 
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Hind agreements were often made verbally, but written documents do survive in 
limited numbers.346 These range from documents a couple of sentences in length, 
to long, detailed contracts which rival the Pitmen’s Bond in length. Unlike the 
Bonds however, there was little attempt to standardise Hind contracts, and the 
content of these contracts varied dramatically.347 
 
It should be evident that there were many similarities between the hiring system 
of coal miners and Hinds. Whilst there was a family wage at work in both 
systems, this was more formal in that of the Hind. In practise, this was also the 
case for mining families, but it was not a part of the Pitmen’s Bond. Both types 
of hiring often involved accommodation, but again this was more frequent for 
Hinds. Hinds also received a greater proportion of wages in goods, whereas 
miners were paid in cash. Both also received benefits, and the facility to keep 
























                                                 
346 J Campbell, “The Northumbrian Agricultural Labourer,” North East History 7 (1973): 30. 
347 see, for example, NRO.2114, NRO.660/4/1, NRO.2380, n.d. available at Northumberland 
Collections Service, Woodhorn Museum, Ashington. 
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Appendix Five: Mortality and Life Expectancy 
 
These data have kindly been supplied by Bowden. A full set with detailed 
occupational breakdown is available, but only industries relevant to the present 
discussion are listed here.   
 
Table 4- Occupational Mortality. These data are estimated by Bowden and 
Mills, using data from the Supplement to the Registrar General's 55th 
Annual Report, PP1893-4, Vol. XXIV, Part II, pp. 124-130, PP 1905, 
Vol.XVIII, 6th Annual Report: Part 2: Cd. 2619, Table 2, pp cxxxiv-cxl. 
1890/02 Template 
Mean age of 
death 
% die under 
34 
Coal miner: Durham and Northumbs 53 25.69 
Coal miner: Lancs 49 26.70 
Coal miner: Staffs 56 19.72 
Coal miner: West Riding 50 26.55 
Coal miner: Derbys and Notts 51 25.80 
Coal miner: Monmouthsire and South Wales 47 34.99 
General labourer (London) 53 18.67 
General labourer (Industrial districts) 53 17.71 
   All males 59 17.24 
Occupied  Males: London 52 20.57 
Occupied males : agricultural districts 63 14.08 
Occupied males: England and Wales 56 18.52 
Occupied males: industrial districts 52 20.08 
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